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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2014 marked the first opportunity for American taxpayers
to receive subsidized health care through the Affordable Care Act’s
(“ACA”) 1 new Premium Tax Credit (“PTC”). The IRS estimates that about
4.8 million people who were enrolled in a Marketplace 2 plan in 2014 were
eligible for a PTC and that 97% of the taxpayers3 who filed a timely 2014
return claiming a PTC received an advance payment of the credit. 4 One year
1
What is commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act is actually the
compilation of two different bills: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). This Article uses the term “ACA” to
refer to the compilation of both acts.
2
See supra Section II.B.6. for a description of the Marketplaces.
3
The term taxpayer is used because the claimant must file a federal tax return to
receive a PTC and it is the term used in the statute. However, the term includes individuals
who may not pay any federal income taxes, either because they have income too low to trigger
the income tax or because their income tax liability is fully reduced by available credits, such
as the Earned Income Tax Credit or the Child Tax Credit.
4
Letter from John Koskinen, IRS Commissioner, to Members of Congress (Jan. 8,
2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irs_letter_aca_stats_010816.pdf. Preliminary data
for tax year 2015, the second year of the PTC, indicates that about 94% of PTC claimants so
far have opted for APTC payments. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., FISCAL YEAR 2017
OBJECTIVES
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
—
VOLUME
ONE
77,
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017JRC/2016_filing_season_review.pdf (data includes returns posted through April 30, 2016,
past the due date for 2015 returns, but not past the due date for taxpayers who requested an
automatic extension).
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later, 2015 marked the first tax filing season where taxpayers received the
unpleasant surprise that they must repay excess credits due to a process
called reconciliation. The advance credit estimates were very inaccurate. The
IRS reported that 51% of PTC claimants in 2014 faced a repayment
obligation, 41% received a PTC on their return higher than the advance
payments, and only 8% claimed a PTC equal to the advance payments
received. 5
When a taxpayer enrolls in a Marketplace plan, he or she may elect
advance payments of the PTC. The advance payments are based on the
Marketplace’s credit estimate, which in turn is based on an estimate of the
taxpayer’s prospective credit-year income and household composition. When
the taxpayer files a return the next year, he or she may discover that the
estimate was not on target and that the taxpayer in fact was eligible for a
lower (or higher) PTC amount. As 2014’s tax statistics demonstrate, it is
difficult to estimate the PTC amount in advance accurately. This Article
illustrates some of the reasons why this is so.
Because of reconciliation, the payment of an advance PTC operates
much more like a loan from the government to the taxpayer than a benefit
payment. This loan-style benefit creates financial risk and uncertainty for the
taxpayers. To the extent that reconciliation creates a tax due that must be
paid, this wreaks havoc on the budgets of lower-income people who
commonly have difficulty weathering even relatively small unexpected
expenses. 6 To the extent reconciliation reduces tax refunds generated by
programs like the Earned Income Tax Credit or the Child Tax Credit, the
PTC is parasitic on those programs, reducing their effectiveness. Even if
reconciliation results in an additional credit amount in favor of the taxpayer,
that credit amount is mismatched to the health insurance spending the PTC is
intended to incentivize; the additional PTC amount did not in the past impact
the health insurance purchasing decision and is unlikely to be sufficiently
large to impact future purchasing decisions.
The PTC is a critical component of the ACA’s goal of achieving
near universal health coverage. Without the PTC, large groups of lowerincome people would likely engage in adverse selection, opting to remain
uninsured until an actual health issue makes purchasing insurance financially
attractive. This adverse selection, in turn, would raise Marketplace plan
premiums for those who elect to buy coverage. It is critical for the success of
the ACA that the PTC be able to do its job of enticing healthy individuals
into the markets (and their corresponding risk pools). Unfortunately, the PTC
reconciliation process may well drive people away from the Marketplaces,

5

Letter from John Koskinen to Members of Congress, supra note 4.
Aimee Picchi, Most Americans Can’t Handle a $500 Surprise Bill, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-cant-handle-a500-surprise-bill.
6
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especially if the obligation to repay excess credits is perceived to be unfair or
punitive. 7
It is a bit like putting a shark in the (risk) pool and then trying to
persuade someone to dive in. The fact that the IRS will be imposing tax
penalties on certain reconciliation obligations starting in tax year 2015
demonstrates that the government considers reconciliation payments as
blameworthy, despite the fact that the income misestimates are easily made
and that the Marketplace is responsible for approving all estimates. 8 The
option of going without coverage to avoid a reconciliation repayment (plus
penalties and interest) will be attractive for individuals for whom the
individual mandate penalty is low or zero and for individuals who are
relatively healthy. This type of adverse selection could prove fatal to the
ACA’s individual policy market.
Part II of this Article examines the PTC’s eligibility and
reconciliation provisions in detail, including an examination of the roles of
the IRS and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in
administering PTC payments. Part III of this Article compares the PTC with
selected social welfare benefits (TANF, SNAP, the EITC, the Health
Coverage Tax Credit, and the ACA’s Cost Sharing Reduction subsidies) that
have salient comparisons to be drawn, focusing on the lessons that can be
learned from the successes and failures of these programs. Part IV of this
Article articulates design goals for making the PTC an effective public policy
tool. Part V of this Article provides concrete proposals for Congress to
reform the PTC to better meet the goals of the program, drawing on the
lessons learned from other programs and the design goals articulated in Part
IV. Anticipating the potential difficulty of obtaining Congressional action on
reform, Part VI of this Article makes a concrete proposal for the IRS to adopt
an administrative exception that would allow a taxpayer to reasonably rely
on a Marketplace’s estimate of the taxpayer’s PTC and avoid reconciliation.
This Article is relevant to those interested in improving the function of the
PTC. This Article has broader relevance to any future proposals that utilize
tax credits payable in advance to deliver benefits.9
7
See Kelli Kennedy, Varying Health Premium Subsidies Worry Consumers,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (July 24, 2014), http://www.abqjournal.com/434642/varying-healthpremium-subsidies-worry-consumers.html (noting that in the face of receiving varying APTC
estimates, “some have decided to go without health insurance because of the uncertainty while
others who went ahead with policies purchased through the exchanges worry they are going to
owe the government money next tax season.”).
8
See infra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text.
9
For example, Representative Paul Ryan (R) sponsored the Patients’ Choice Act in
the 2009-2010 Congressional session. That act relies in part on a refundable tax credit that is
payable in advance to make insurance affordable for lower-income Americans. Patient’s
Choice Act, H.R. 2520, 111th Cong. § 301, (2009), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111thcongress/house-bill/2520/text. More recently, a task force of House Republicans released a
report outlining its vision of what health reform should look like, and it relies in part on a
“universal advanceable, refundable tax credit” to help make insurance affordable. House
Republican Health Care Reform Task Force, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident
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II. THE PREMIUM TAX CREDIT: FUNCTION AND DESIGN
A. Function of the PTC in the ACA Health Reform
One of the primary goals of the ACA was to expand health care
coverage to a near-universal level. 10 The ACA relies on interlocking reforms
to advance this lofty goal. 11 Because the goal is near-universal coverage, the
ACA mandates that almost all individuals have health care coverage or pay a
tax penalty. 12 The ACA expanded Medicaid to ensure that the lowest-income
people have access to coverage without premiums or cost sharing, with the
federal government picking up no less than 90% of the cost of covering the
expansion population. 13 The ACA mandated that larger employers provide
affordable, quality health coverage to their employees or face tax penalties. 14
For those individuals who are not eligible for Medicaid and who do not have
access to affordable employer coverage, the ACA created an online platform
to make shopping for individual health coverage easier: the exchange or
health insurance marketplace (“Marketplace”). 15 For lower-income people
America:
Health
Care
14
(June
22,
2016),
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-PolicyPaper.pdf.
10
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (“The Act
aims to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost
of health care.”).
11
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (“The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in
the individual health insurance market. First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person’s
health into account when deciding whether to sell health insurance or how much to charge.
Second, the Act generally requires each person to maintain insurance coverage or make a
payment to the Internal Revenue Service. And third, the Act gives tax credits to certain people
to make insurance more affordable.”).
12
Code § 5000A. For a detailed analysis of the shared responsibility payment
provisions, see Francine J. Lipman & James Owens, Irresponsibly Taxing Irresponsibility:
The Individual Tax Penalty under the Affordable Care Act, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
463 (2016).
13
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(10)(VIII), 1396d(y). While the ACA originally conditioned
the receipt of any federal funding for Medicaid on a state’s implementation of this expansion,
the United States Supreme Court found that to be an unconstitutional condition on the receipt
of Medicaid money, with the result that the Medicaid expansion became voluntary for states.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-08 (2012). To date, 32 states
have accepted the Medicaid expansion, while 19 states have not. THE HENRY J. KAISER
FOUND., CURRENT STATUS OF STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISIONS, http://kff.org/healthreform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-decision/ (last visited July 25, 2016).
14
Code §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2).
15
42 U.S.C. § 18031(b), (d) (requiring each state to establish a health insurance
marketplace); 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (permitting the federal government to establish a
marketplace on behalf of any state that fails to do so itself, known as a federally-facilitated
marketplace); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 and Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(k) (treating all marketplaces,
including the federally-facilitated marketplace established on behalf of a state, as a “state”
marketplace); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495-96 (2015) (finding the IRS’s
interpretation to be consistent with a reading of the ACA that takes into account the ACA’s
context and structure).
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who are not eligible for Medicaid, the ACA subsidizes individual health
coverage purchased in the Marketplace through the PTC. 16 Finally, for
certain lower-income people who are eligible for a PTC-subsidized
Marketplace policy, the ACA provides access to special plans with reduced
cost sharing (lower deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, etc.). 17
The PTC is a critically important cog in the ACA reform
mechanism. Without the PTC, lower- to moderate-income people likely
would find it financially infeasible to purchase individual policies. Such
individuals would likely opt out of the system, choosing to not purchase an
unaffordable policy. All (or virtually all) people would find paying the tax
penalty for not having coverage far less costly than paying for an
unsubsidized individual health policy. 18 In addition, many of the people
targeted for the PTC would not owe the tax penalty for failing to maintain
health coverage because there are exemptions from the tax penalty for an
individual (1) whose income falls below the threshold for having an
obligation to file a tax return, 19 (2) if coverage is deemed unaffordable for
the individual, 20 or (3) who is experiencing a hardship that undermines the
individual’s ability to obtain qualifying health care coverage. 21 There are
other exemptions from the individual mandate tax penalty. 22 Thus, without a
well-designed, functional PTC, many low- to moderate-income people may
opt out of coverage, choosing instead to pay the lower penalty or seeking an
exception from the penalty.
It is also likely that those who choose to opt of coverage will be
relatively healthy. Relatively healthy people generally value health coverage
less than people with health conditions and needs. When faced with multiple
16

Code § 36B.
42 U.S.C. § 18071; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80
Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,826 (Feb. 27, 2015). See infra Section II.E. for details regarding the
ACA’s cost sharing reduction subsidies.
18
The average unsubsidized premium for a Marketplace individual policy in 2016 is
$396 per month, counting the premiums for plans actually selected by individuals. Dep’t of
Health and Hum. Services, Health Insurance Marketplace Premiums after Shopping,
Switching, and Premium Tax Credits, 2015–2016, 9 (Apr. 12, 2016)
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/198636/MarketplaceRate.pdf. This is far less than
the average tax penalty paid in 2015 for not having coverage, which was around $210 for the
year. Letter from John Koskinen to Members of Congress, supra note 4.
19
In 2016, single individuals with less than $10,350 of income do not have an
obligation to file a tax return (higher if they are under age 65 or blind). Code § 6012; Rev.
Proc. 2015-53, 2014-44 I.R.B. 615 (Nov. 2, 2015).
20
Coverage is deemed unaffordable if the lowest-priced coverage available costs
more than 8.13 percent (in 2016) of household income, after applying the PTC. Code §
5000A(e)(1)(D); Rev. Proc. 2014-62, 2014-50 I.R.B. 948 (Dec. 8, 2014). The affordability
threshold (also called the required contribution percentage) is 8%, but is indexed annually to
account for inflation – specifically “the excess of the rate of premium growth between the
preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate of income growth for such period.” Code §
5000A(e)(1)(D).
21
Code § 5000A(e)(5).
22
Code §§ 5000A(d), (e).
17
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potential uses for limited money, healthy people are more likely to opt to
spend money on more immediate needs and goals, like rent, car repairs, or
school supplies. In addition, because the ACA prohibits the application of
preexisting condition exclusions and prohibits charging higher premiums
based on health status or claims experience, relatively healthy people for
whom health insurance is too costly can simply wait until they need the
insurance to purchase it. 23 It is true that people cannot buy insurance at any
time they wish. New coverage can be added in the Marketplace only at the
annual enrollment period or during special enrollment periods.24 Therefore,
there is clearly some risk to taking the strategy of waiting to purchase
insurance until illness or accident strikes. The newly-ill person would have to
wait until the next special or open enrollment period to add coverage,
probably delaying treatment for that period of time as well, unless he or she
is able to find a doctor or institution willing to provide charity care.
As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in its King vs.
Burwell decision, such adverse selection can have a devastating effect on the
cost of health insurance. 25 If healthier people are not included in the
insurance risk pool, the cost of insurance goes up because the covered losses
are high on a per-covered-person basis. The more expensive insurance is, the
more likely it is that healthier people will opt out of purchasing it, making
the risk pool more unhealthy and driving costs higher. It is this insurance
cost “death spiral” that was of such concern in King v. Burwell. 26
Thus, the PTC is a critical piece in the ACA’s plan to achieve near
universal coverage and bring insurance costs down. The design of the PTC
should reinforce its critical role in incentivizing lower- to moderate-income
people to purchase health insurance. The design of the PTC should
encourage people to opt into the risk pool, rather than opt out.

23

42 U.S.C. § 300gg, gg-3, gg-4.
42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(6) (requiring an initial enrollment period, annual open
enrollment periods, special enrollment periods, and monthly enrollment periods for Indians).
There is some concern among insurers that special enrollment periods are being misused by
customers, leading to high levels of adverse selection. In response, the Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) announced a narrowing of eligibility criteria for special
enrollment periods as well as increased enforcement efforts. Kevin Counihan, Clarifying,
Eliminating and Enforcing Special Enrollment Periods, THE CMS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://blog.cms.gov/2016/01/19/clarifying-eliminating-and-enforcing-special-enrollmentperiods/. Other commentators have argued that special enrollment periods actually are
underused. Laurel Lucia, How Do We Make Special Enrollment Periods Work?,
HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 16, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/16/how-do-wemake-special-enrollment-periods-work/.
25
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485-86 (2015).
26
Id. at 2484.
24
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B. Current PTC Design and Operation
1. The Basic Rules
The PTC is a federal subsidy which helps low- and moderate-income
people buy individual health insurance policies on the Marketplace.
Generally speaking, a PTC is available to a person with household income
between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line (“FPL”) 27 if the person
purchases a Marketplace health insurance policy and if the person is not
otherwise eligible for or actually covered by a qualifying employer or public
health plan. 28 The eligibility rules are discussed in more detail in Section
II.B.3. infra. The amount of the PTC varies depending on the cost of plans
where the person lives as well as the person’s household income and family
size, both of which are discussed in detail in Section II.B.4. infra. 29 The PTC
is a refundable tax credit. 30 Thus, the PTC first reduces the taxpayer’s tax
liability to as low as zero, and if there is credit left over, the taxpayer
receives that left over credit amount as a refund. 31 A person will receive a
PTC amount for each month that he or she is eligible. 32 However, the inputs
for calculating the PTC (cost of available plans, income, and household size)
are annualized.
The PTC may be claimed retroactively on a tax return; the credit for
any month in 2014 would be claimed on a 2014 tax return, normally filed
before April 15, 2015. 33 The PTC also may be paid on an advance basis. 34 If
the advance credit (the “APTC”) is elected, the estimated amount of the PTC
is calculated by the Marketplace and payments are made by the IRS directly

27
The federal poverty figures are published by the Department of Health and
Human Services in the Federal Register at the start of every year. The figures that apply for a
year are the most-recently published figures as of the beginning of the open enrollment period
for that year. Code § 36B(d)(3). The open enrollment period for 2016 began November 1,
2015. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,866
(Feb. 27, 2015). Thus, the poverty figures that apply for 2016 are the figures published at the
start of 2015. For 2016, the poverty line for a single individual not living in Alaska or Hawaii
is $11,770; each additional family member adds $4,160 to the poverty line. Annual Update of
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3,236, 3,237 (Jan. 22, 2015). Thus, for 2016, between
100% and 400% of the FPL for a single person means between $11,770 and $46,800. The
poverty line is higher in Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
28
Code § 36B.
29
Code § 36B(b)(2).
30
Code §§ 36B(b)(2), 6401.
31
I.R.S., Questions and Answers on the Premium Tax Credit,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Premium-Tax-Credit,
question 1 (last visited May 24, 2016) [hereinafter IRS PTC Q&A] (“The credit is
“refundable” because, if the amount of the credit is more than the amount of your tax liability,
you will receive the difference as a refund.”).
32
Code § 36B(b).
33
Code § 36B(a).
34
42 U.S.C. § 18082.
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to the insurance company covering the individual. 35 APTC payments are
reconciled on the tax return for the year of the payments, meaning advance
payments made during 2014 were reconciled on the tax return for 2014,
normally filed before April 15, 2015. 36
If the amount of the PTC on the tax return is higher than the advance
payments made during the year, that excess amount will be a refundable
credit, which will either lower the taxpayer’s tax due or result in a refund. 37
If the amount of the credit on the tax return is lower than the advance
payments made during the year, the taxpayer will have to repay the deficit;
the deficit amount will either lower the taxpayer’s refund or the return will
show an amount due. 38 Repayment is subject to certain caps. 39 There is no
cap for a taxpayer at or above 400% of the FPL. 40 For taxpayers below 400%
of the FPL, the maximum repayment ranges from $300 to $2,500 depending
on filing status and income level. 41 Congress has amended the ACA twice
since it was enacted to raise the repayment caps, and a bill that would
eliminate the repayment caps altogether was reported out of committee in
March 2016 and placed on the calendar of the House of Representatives.42
The repayment amount may result in a late payment penalty (if the
taxpayer is unable to pay the amount due by April 15) or a penalty for the
underpayment of estimated tax (if the taxpayer failed to have enough tax
withheld during the year or to make sufficient estimated tax payments). 43
35

Id.
Code § 36B(f).
37
IRS PTC Q&A, supra note 31, at question 22 (“When you complete your tax
return, you will figure your credit and compare it to the amount of APTC on Form 8962. . . . If
your actual allowable credit is more than your APTC, the difference will be added to your
refund or subtracted from your balance due.”).
38
IRS PTC Q&A, supra note 31, at question 22 (“When you complete your tax
return, you will figure your credit and compare it to the amount of APTC on Form 8962. If
your actual allowable credit on your return is less than your APTC, the difference, subject to
certain repayment caps, will be subtracted from your refund or added to your balance due.”).
39
Id.
40
Code § 36B(f).
41
Id.
42
Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-309, § 208, 124
Stat. 3285, 3291-92 (2010) (replacing the original repayment caps for taxpayers with income
under 400% of the FPL of $250 for single taxpayer and $400 for all other taxpayers with a
graduated table of repayment caps ranging from $3,500 to $600 for taxpayers with income
under 500% of the FPL); Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of
Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, § 4, 125 Stat. 36, 36-37
(2011) (replacing the graduated table of repayment caps ranging from $3,500 to $600 for
taxpayers with income under 500% of the FPL to a different graduated table of repayment
caps ranging from $2,500 to $600 for taxpayers with income under 400% of the FPL);
Protecting Taxpayers by Recovering Improper Obamacare Subsidy Overpayments Act, H.R.
4723, 114th Cong. (2016).
43
Code § 6651(a)(2) (penalty assessed for failure to pay entire tax liability by April
15); Code § 6654 (penalty assessed for failure to pay, through withholding or estimated tax
payments, the greater of 100% of the prior year tax liability or 90% of the current year tax
liability).
36
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These penalties were waived for tax year 2014, but the IRS did not extend
the waiver. 44
While APTC payments may make health insurance accessible by
solving a cash flow problem, they do create the risk that the taxpayer will
have a nasty surprise come tax time. 45 This risk can be mitigated by opting to
receive only some of the expected credit amount on an advance basis. 46 The
risk also can be mitigated somewhat by the taxpayer diligently reporting to
the Marketplace every month changes to his or her household income or
family size (perhaps not the most realistic expectation for taxpayer behavior).
The Marketplace in turn will adjust the APTC payments made to the
insurance company to take into account the changed circumstances.
However, the only way to completely eliminate the risk of owing money
back to the IRS (potentially with penalties) is to forego the APTC payments.
2. Amount of the PTC
The amount of the PTC is calculated based on the taxpayer’s
household income and family size as well as the cost for a benchmark plan
(or the cost for the actual plan selected, if lower).47 The benchmark plan is
the second-lowest cost “silver” plan that can cover the taxpayer’s entire
household. 48 The Marketplace categorizes plans by “metal colors”; plans are
classified, from least generous to most generous, as bronze, silver, gold, and
platinum. A silver plan has a benefit structure (amount of copayments,
coinsurance, and deductibles) more generous than a bronze plan but not as
generous as a gold or platinum plan. 49 The cost for the benchmark plan is the
cost to the taxpayer if he or she were to actually enroll in the benchmark
plan. 50 Thus, the cost of the benchmark plan will vary depending on the

44

I.R.S. Notice 2015-9, 2015-6 I.R.B. 590, Feb. 9, 2015; I.R.S., Instructions for
Form 2210, at 1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i2210.pdf (noting that “[i]f you
received premium assistance through advance payments of the PTC in 2015, and the amount
advanced exceeded the amount of PTC you can take, you could be subject to a penalty for
underpaying your estimated tax.”).
45
For a detailed analysis of reconciliation under different hypothetical fact patterns,
see Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Reconciling the Premium Tax Credit: Painful
Complications for Lower and Middle-Income Taxpayers, 69 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2794466).
46
Premium
Tax
Credit,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/premium-tax-credit/ (last visited May 24, 2016).
47
Code § 36B(b).
48
This could be a combination of plans if the family is unable to be covered by a
single plan, for example because a child is away at college or because of the relationships
between the family members. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-3(f)(3).
49
See generally Your Insurance Choices in a Marketplace: FAQ, WEBMD.COM,
http://www.webmd.com/health-insurance/insurance-marketplace/marketplace-insurancechoices (last visited May 24, 2016).
50
Code § 36B(b)(3)(C).
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taxpayer’s location, family size, and the ages of the enrollees. 51 The PTC
amount is the premium amount for the benchmark plan less the expected
taxpayer contribution toward the premium. The taxpayer’s contribution
varies depending on the taxpayer’s household income and ranges from 2% of
income to 9.5% of income. 52 It is important to note that, although the PTC
amount is based on the cost for the benchmark plan, the taxpayer is free to
enroll in a lower cost or higher cost plan. 53
3. Eligibility for the PTC
There are several eligibility criteria for claiming a PTC: (1) the
taxpayer must have “household income” between 100% and 400% of the
FPL; 54 (2) the taxpayer cannot be eligible to be claimed as the dependent of
any other person; 55 (3) the taxpayer must file a joint return if considered
married within the meaning of Code § 7703; 56 (4) the taxpayer must not be
51

The ACA permits insurers to charge higher premiums to older insureds; an older
insured may be charged up to three times more than a younger insured. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg(a)(1). Any age-based adjustment in premiums will be taken into account under the
benchmark plan for calculating the PTC. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-3(e). The benchmark plan,
however, will not take into account a premium adjustment for tobacco use; the ACA allows
insurers to charge tobacco users up to 1.5 times the premium it would charge a non-user. Id.;
42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1).
52
Code §§ 36B(b)(2), (3)(A). The calculation of the taxpayer’s required
contribution is fairly complicated, although online calculators can help taxpayers (and their
advisors) estimate the likely contribution amount. See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUND.,
SUBSIDY CALCULATOR, http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/ (last visited May 24,
2016).
53
Code § 36B(b)(3)(B); Cent. on Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Premium Tax Credits:
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS,
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/QA-on-Premium-Credits.pdf (July 2013).
54
Code § 36B(c)(1)(A). As discussed supra in note 27, for 2016, between 100% and
400% of the FPL for a single person means between $11,770 and $46,800, with higher
amounts in Alaska and Hawaii. Annual Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg.
3236, 3237 (Jan. 22, 2015).
55
Code § 36B(c)(1)(D). Notice that this is different than actually being claimed as a
dependent of another taxpayer, despite the language in the FAQs posted on the IRS’s website.
The IRS’s FAQs states that the claimant “cannot be claimed as a dependent by another
person.” IRS PTC Q&A, supra note 31, at question 5. This is contrary to the plain language of
the statute and likely represents an oversight rather than a conscious interpretation choice.
56
Code § 36B(c)(1)(C). Temporary and proposed IRS regulations create a limited
exception to this requirement for victims of domestic violence and spousal abandonment.
Rules Regarding the Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 79 Fed. Reg. 43,622 (July 28,
2014) (issuing temporary regulations to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Rules Regarding the
Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 79 Fed. Reg. 43,693 (July 28, 2014) (issuing proposed
regulations to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). This author has argued that the exception is
laudable and that it should be extended to cover more categories of taxpayers (such as longseparated spouses) and to apply to other tax benefits (such as the EITC). Mary Leto Pareja,
Beyond the Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit: Ensuring Access to Safety Net
Programs, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 241 (2015). Other scholars have proposed other solutions to
the problem of married taxpayers losing tax benefits for filing separate rather than joint
returns. See, e.g., Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals To Ease
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eligible for government-sponsored coverage such as Medicare, Medicaid,
CHIP, or TRICARE; 57 (5) the taxpayer must not be eligible for an employersponsored plan that is affordable and provides minimum value; 58 (6) neither
the taxpayer nor any member of the taxpayer’s “household” can be actually
enrolled in an employer-sponsored plan, whether or not the plan is
considered affordable or to provide minimum value; 59 and (7) the taxpayer,
taxpayer’s spouse, or taxpayer’s dependent must have purchased coverage
through a Marketplace and paid the premium for the coverage. 60 There are
special rules that apply to non-citizens that are beyond the scope of this
Article.
4. Determining Family Size and Household Income
Because the taxpayer’s “family” and “household income” are so
important to eligibility for the PTC as well as the calculation of the amount
of the PTC, it is worth looking closely at how those two concepts are
defined. The “family” consists of all the individuals for whom a taxpayer is
allowed to claim a “personal exemption amount” under Code § 151 for the
taxable year. 61 Code § 151 allows taxpayers to subtract from income a
“personal exemption amount” for themselves, their spouse if filing jointly,
and for eligible dependents claimed on the return.62 Thus, “family” for PTC
purposes really refers to the tax unit and not to a family law or a more
the Sting for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately, 19 FL. TAX REV.(forthcoming 2016)
(available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2739948) (arguing alternatively that the current
PTC exception be extended to other tax benefits, or that credits be calculated based on
residence and not simply marital status, or that a married taxpayer filing separately be entitled
to half the credit amount available to a single taxpayer); Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest
Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010) (arguing
that joint returns should be abolished).
57
Code §§ 36B(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f)(1)(A). This applies on a month-by-month basis
and is based on eligibility for the plan, not enrollment in the plan. Thus, if a person meets all
the eligibility requirements for a PTC in January, but becomes eligible for Medicare starting in
February, the person will receive a PTC only for January, even if the person does not actually
enroll in Medicare. Id.
58
Code § 36B(c)(2)(C). A plan is considered “affordable” if the employee’s share of
the premium for self-only coverage is 9.5% or less of the employee’s “household income.”
Code § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i). A plan is considered to provide minimum value if it covers at least
60% of the total allowed costs of benefits under the plan. Code § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii).
59
Code § 36B(c)(2)(C)(iii).
60
Code § 36B(c)(2)(A). The statute requires that the individual be enrolled “through
an Exchange established by the State . . .” Id. As discussed supra in note 15, this includes state
marketplaces as well as the federally-facilitated marketplace.
61
The term “exemption” is a confusing misnomer, given that the amount of the
“personal exemption” is actually a below-the-line deduction from adjusted gross income.
Code § 151.
62
This is a simplification of the spousal exemption rules. If the taxpayers are filing
jointly, they each get a personal exemption as taxpayers. Code § 151(b). If they are not filing
jointly, a taxpayer may claim a personal exemption for his or her spouse if the spouse had no
gross income and was not the dependent of another taxpayer. Id.
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common parlance understanding of family. 63 Family for PTC purposes also
differs in some key respects from how household size is determined for
purposes of Medicaid; generally, tax dependents are not part of the
household for Medicaid eligibility if the tax filer is a non-custodial parent or
is not the parent of the tax dependent.64 Still different rules apply for SNAP
and frequently TANF benefits, which use a more functional definition tied to
program goals. 65
The rules for who can be claimed as a dependent on a tax return are
not as simple as one would hope. 66 However, generally speaking, the
following broad categories of people potentially qualify as dependents of a
taxpayer, if they meet other requirements: (1) the taxpayer’s descendants,
siblings, and sibling’s descendants (nieces and nephews, grand-nieces and
grand-nephews, etc.) provided the dependent is unmarried, lives with the
taxpayer the majority of the year, is under age 19, or a full-time student and
under age 24, or any age but permanently disabled, and does not provide
most of his or her own support; 67 (2) almost anyone that lives with the
taxpayer as part of the household for the entire year as well as the taxpayer’s
descendants, siblings, nieces and nephews (but not grand-nieces or grandnephews), direct ancestors, and aunts and uncles (but not their descendants),
provided the dependent makes under the personal exemption amount for the
year (for 2014, $3,950) 68 and provided that the taxpayer provides more than
half of the dependent’s support. 69 This is merely a broad summary of the

63
See generally Tessa R. Davis, Taxing Modern Families: Mapping the Families of
Tax, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179 (2014) (discussing the different broad conceptions of
family in the Code and how those conceptions compare to family law conceptions of family).
64
For example, a parent who is a tax dependent of a son or daughter, and thus part
of the household for purposes of the PTC, is not part of the son or daughter’s household for
Medicaid purposes. Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Part II: Determining Households
and Income for Premium Tax Credits and Medicaid, HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS,
slides 32, 33 (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.healthreformbeyondthebasics.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/Webinar-10-15-15-Part-II_Household-Size-and-Income.pdf; Tricia
Brooks, GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Getting MAGI
Right: Exceptions for Who Counts in the Household for Medicaid and CHIP (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/getting-magi-right-exceptions-counts-household-medicaid-chip/.
65
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP): Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2016) (with some exceptions, for SNAP “[e]veryone
who lives together and purchases and pre together is grouped together as one household.”),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility; TANF eligibility rules vary because the program
operates as a block grant to the states.
66
See generally Mary Leto Pareja, Earned Income Tax Portability: Respecting the
Autonomy of American Families, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 11–28 (2014) (discussing the mechanics
of the rules for claiming dependents on a tax return).
67
Code § 152(c).These dependents are called “qualifying children” even though
they are not necessarily children or the taxpayer’s biological children. Id.
68
Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 42 (Nov. 18, 2013).
69
Code § 152(d). These dependents are called “qualifying relatives” even though
the potential dependent does not actually need to be related to the taxpayer. Id.
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rules; there are many wrinkles and exceptions that have been left out in the
interest of brevity.
Correspondingly, “household income” is the income of the “family”
-- or tax unit -- described above, with an important exception. The income of
a family member (i.e., a spouse or tax dependent) is ignored if the family
member is not “required to file a return of tax imposed by [Code] section 1
for the taxable year.” 70 Code § 1 is the section that imposes the income tax; it
does not contain any rules regarding the requirement to file a return. The
rules regarding when there is a requirement to file a return to report taxes
imposed under Code § 1 are contained in Code § 6012. Code § 6012 exempts
an individual from the obligation to file a return to report the tax applicable
under Code § 1 if the individual’s income is not more than the personal
exemption amount ($3,950 for 2014) plus the applicable standard deduction
amount (in 2014, ranging from $6,200 for single taxpayers to $12,400 for
joint taxpayers to $17,200 for blind and over age 65 taxpayers filing
jointly). 71 In other words, for ACA purposes, a family member’s income
(including a spouse) would not count toward household income if it is under
the applicable threshold, ranging from $10,150 to $21,150 in 2014 depending
on the circumstances.72 An individual may be required to file a tax return for
other reasons, even though he or she is exempt from filing a return under the
Code § 6012 rules. For example, if a person has over $400 of income from
self-employment, he or she must file a return to report employment taxes. 73
Additionally, there are many situations where a person will want to file a
return even if he or she is not required to; for example, to receive a refund of
over-withholding or a refundable tax credit like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (“EITC”). In such cases, that person’s income is not counted toward
household income for ACA purposes.
Household income is actually “modified adjusted gross income.” 74
Modified adjusted gross income begins with the person’s adjusted gross
income. 75 The adjusted gross income is modified by adding back in any
amounts excluded under the foreign income exclusion of Code § 911, and
any tax-exempt interest, and any portion of Social Security benefits excluded
under Code § 86. 76 There are clear inequities in using this definition to

70

Code § 36B(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
I.R.S. Notice 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537; see also I.R.S. PUB. 501, EXEMPTIONS,
STANDARD
DEDUCTION,
AND
FILING
INFORMATION
(2014)
at
24–26,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf.
72
Id.
73
Code § 6017.
74
Code § 36B(d)(2).
75
Id. Adjusted gross income is a tax term of art. It is the taxpayer’s gross income as
reported on his or her return less certain “above-the-line” deductions, such as the deduction
for alimony paid, the deduction for certain tuition payments, and the deduction for one-half of
self-employment taxes. Code § 62.
76
Code § 36B(d)(2)(B).
71
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measure an individual’s ability to afford health care. For example,
completely excluded from this definition of income is inherited wealth.77
It is critical to understand that the PTC amount ultimately is based
on the household composition and income reported on the tax return for the
year -- in other words retrospectively. The APTC amount requires a
projection or estimate of the anticipated PTC amount, which in turn requires
an estimate of credit-year, prospective household composition and income.
For some taxpayers these prospective amounts are relatively easy to predict
and do not fluctuate much from year to year. A person with a stable family
and a stable job that pays a salary without possibility for bonuses would
probably find estimating a future PTC a fairly easy task. The rest of us would
likely find such a task difficult, in some cases close to impossible. There are
multiple variables that could cause an estimate to be off. Because family size
is tied to the dependency exemption which in turn is tied to custody or a
negotiated relinquishment of the exemption, a family experiencing a custody
dispute will have a difficult time predicting a future PTC. An employee with
variable hours or multiple or unpredictable jobs will find predicting a future
PTC difficult. For example, the young single mom who works three part time
jobs to make ends meet, but who never knows when her hours will be cut or
she will be asked to work double shifts, probably does not have a reliable
way to predict what her cumulative income will be. An employee who has a
possibility of incentive pay, such as bonuses or commissions, will have
difficulty predicting a future PTC. For example, a low-paid worker who has
the good fortune of working at a company that has a banner year and
announces generous end-of-year bonuses will have mispredicted his future
PTC amount. A self-employed person may find predicting a future PTC
difficult. A person newly self-employed may find predicting a future PTC so
difficult it amounts to little more than a shot in the dark. With the rise of the
“gig economy” and the expansion of the use of contingent workers, such
fluctuations in income will become even more common than they have been
traditionally. 78 Individuals with unanticipated lump sum income also will
find it difficult to predict a future PTC. For example, a grandparent who
withdraws a lump sum from an IRA to help with a family emergency will
have mispredicted his or her future PTC amount. A person who receives a
lump sum payment of retroactive social security disability benefits will have
mispredicted his or her future PTC amount. 79 These are only some situations
77
Thus, for example, an individual who has no earned income (meaning they do not
work), and who has investment income between $11,770 and $46,800 (or between 100% and
400% of the FPL in 2016 as explained in supra note 27) has income qualifying him or her for
a PTC even if the individual also receives thousands or even millions of dollars from a family
trust.
78
INTUIT,
INTUIT
2020
REPORT
21
(Oct.
2010),
http://httpdownload.intuit.com/http.intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf (“In
the U.S. alone, contingent workers will exceed 40 percent of the workforce by 2020.”).
79
This particular problem was highlighted by the National Taxpayer Advocate,
Nina Olson, in her 2015 report to Congress. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., MOST
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where predicting a future PTC is difficult. A person receiving an APTC is
required to report income and family composition changes during the year;
the APTC amount would then be adjusted upward or downward. 80 However,
some people experience such wide fluctuations that this process still will not
result in an accurate estimate. In addition, if the unanticipated income occurs
late in the year, it may not be possible to adjust the remaining APTC
payments to avoid a reconciliation repayment obligation. For example, if the
grandmother takes her lump sum IRA withdrawal in December to deal with
an unexpected family emergency, the reconciliation repayment obligation
cannot be avoided.
5. A Slight Detour: Cost Sharing Reduction Subsidies
The PTC has a lesser known cousin within the ACA that is designed
to make insurance and health care affordable – the cost-sharing reduction
(“CSR”) subsidies. 81 If a taxpayer is estimated to have household income
between 100% and 250% of the FPL for the year of the subsidy, 82 meets
requirements for an APTC, and is enrolled in a silver level Marketplace plan,
then the taxpayer is eligible to enroll in a plan with reduced cost sharing. 83
Lower-income people receive larger reductions in cost sharing. 84 The
subsidy does not come in the form of a tax credit or a check to the insured.
Rather, the Marketplace directs the insurance company to place the eligible
person in a special insurance plan that has the exact same features as a
regular plan, except that the insured’s cost sharing (such as deductibles and
copays) for essential health benefits are reduced.85 The insured person never
SERIOUS
PROBLEMS,
2015
ANN.
REP.
TO
CONGRESS
175,
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1_MSP
_15_ACA-Individuals.pdf.
80
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
81
42 U.S.C. § 18071.
82
The careful reader will notice that the statute provides that taxpayers between
100% and 400% of the FPL are eligible for cost sharing subsidies, while the regulations
narrow that range to between 100% and 250% of the FPL. 42 U.S.C. § 18071(b); 45 C.F.R. §
155.305(g). The reason for this is that the statute specifies particular reductions in out of
pocket costs, but also requires those reductions to be coordinated so that the actuarial values
of the plans do not increase above a certain amount. 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c). Each year, HHS
has determined that no reductions are possible for taxpayers over 250% of the FPL that would
not cause the plan to fail the actuarial value test. 42 U.S.C. § 18071; HHS Notice of Benefit
and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,826 (Feb. 27, 2015). For 2016,
between 100% and 250% of the FPL is between $11,770 and $29,425 for a single person and
between $47,080 and $117,700 for a family of four. See supra note 27.
83
42 U.S.C. § 18071(b); 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g). Indians up to 300% of the FPL can
receive a no-cost-sharing plan regardless of the metal level of the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 18071(d).
84
42 U.S.C. § 18071(c); 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g).
85
CENT. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Draft Manual for Reconciliation of
Advance Payment of Cost-Sharing Reductions for Benefit Years 2014 and 2015, at 5 (Jan. 15,
2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/CMSGuidance-on-CSR-Reconciliation.pdf [hereinafter CMS, Draft Manual].
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experiences a reconciliation process similar to the PTC. If it turns out that the
insured person’s annual income for the subsidy year was too high for the
level of cost sharing reduction he or she received, he or she will not be
obligated to repay any portion of the cost sharing that he or she avoided
(absent fraud). 86 The federal government sends money directly to the
person’s insurance company to pay for the reduced cost sharing. 87 The
insurance companies (not the covered individuals) receive estimated
payments and then must go through a reconciliation process where the
estimates are compared against actual expenses. 88 Eligibility for the CSR
subsidies is determined by the Marketplace using the same process as
eligibility for the APTC.
6. The Marketplace’s Role in Authorizing an APTC
The Marketplaces play a critical role in the PTC process. A
Marketplace is an Amazon.com-like online platform where individuals can
shop for and enroll in individual health insurance policies; there is a separate
marketplace for small employers. 89 The Marketplaces are sometimes also
called exchanges. 90 There is a separate Marketplace for each state. 91 Some
states run their own Marketplace under regulations issued by the Health and
Human Services Department.92 For example, California’s Covered California

86

Cent. on Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Key Facts: Cost Sharing Reductions,
Dec. 3, 2015),
HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS, (last updated
http://www.healthreformbeyondthebasics.org/cost-sharing-charges-in-marketplace-healthinsurance-plans-part-2/.
87
Id. In the latest challenge to the ACA, the U.S. House of Representatives is
challenging the federal reimbursement of the CSR subsidies incurred by the insurance
companies, arguing that the ACA did not contain a continuing appropriation of money for
these payments and that Congress did not authorize any annual appropriation for these
payments; a District Court judge recently ruled in favor the U.S. House of Representatives.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC) (D.D.C. May 12, 2016)
(decision),
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2014cv1967-73.
The
decision will certainly be appealed, and the judge has stayed the decision in anticipation of an
appeal. Id. The case is important to watch for its impact on CSR subsidies as well as
premiums and PTC amounts. See generally Timothy Jost, Judge Rules Against Administration
In Cost-Sharing Reduction Payment Case, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 12, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/05/12/judge-blocks-reimbursement-of-insurers-for-aca-costsharing-reduction-payments/.
88
CMS, Draft Manual, supra note 85, at 5.
89
Health
Insurance
Marketplace,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/health-insurance-marketplace-glossary/ (last visited June
30, 2016).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUND., STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE TYPES,
2016,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplacetypes/#note-4 (last visited June 30, 2016).
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is a state-based Marketplace. 93 Other states run a Marketplace in partnership
with the federal government, with some functions handled by the state and
others handled by the HHS. 94 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(“CMS”), a division of HHS, is responsible for the federally-facilitated
Marketplace. 95 There is a wide variety within this category, with some states
merely using CMS’s information technology platform to other states relying
on CMS for most functions. 96 Oregon and Michigan are examples of
partnership Marketplaces. 97 Most states have opted to allow CMS to run a
Marketplace on their behalf, called a federally-facilitated marketplace.98 This
Article focuses on the federally-facilitated Marketplace, because it is
servicing most of the states. However, similar issues arise in the state-based
and partnership Marketplaces.
While it is possible for a taxpayer to enroll in a Marketplace
individual plan and wait to claim a PTC on the tax return filed the following
year, most taxpayers do not do this, principally because their budgets are
unable to absorb such a large up-front cost. 99 The process begins when a
person seeking insurance contacts the Marketplace and completes an
application. 100 The Marketplace will screen the person for eligibility for
Medicaid and CHIP. 101 Next, the Marketplace will screen the person for
eligibility to enroll in a Marketplace plan. 102 Finally, the Marketplace will
screen the person for eligibility for and the amount of an APTC and cost
sharing reductions. 103
The Marketplace then attempts to verify the applicant’s claimed
household size and household income by comparing the application with

93

Id. For an interesting description of the benefits and challenges to a state of
running a state-based marketplace, see Brendan W. Williams, A Better “Exchange”: Some
States, Including Washington, Control Their Health Care Markets While Most Surrender
Autonomy to Resist Reform, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 595 (2012/2013).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
45 C.F.R. § 155.310(b) (applicant has a right to request that a Marketplace not
determine his or her eligibility for insurance affordability programs, including the APTC). Of
taxpayers who timely claimed a PTC for tax year 2014, 97% received APTC payments. Letter
from John Koskinen to Members of Congress, supra note 4.
100
45 C.F.R. § 155.310(a).
101
45 C.F.R. § 155.345.
102
45 C.F.R. § 155.315. This involves verifying the Social Security number
provided by the individual with the Social Security Administration, verifying the immigration
status of the individual with the Department of Homeland Security, verifying the individual’s
residency by examining approved electronic data sources, and verifying the individual’s
incarceration status by examining approved electronic data sources. Id.
103
45 C.F.R. § 155.320.
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information obtained from the federal data hub. 104 The federal data hub
contains information from the IRS (prior year tax returns) and the Social
Security Administration (social security benefits that are excluded from
taxable income), as well as information from the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (to verify immigration status) and The Work Number (a
service owned by Equifax for verifying employment and income). 105 If the
taxpayer attests that the (historic) data in the federal data hub accurately
represents family size and household income for the year of the APTC, the
Marketplace is required to accept that representation.106
With respect to family size, if information is not available from the
federal data hub, or if the taxpayer attests that a change in circumstances has
or will change the family size, the Marketplace will attempt to verify the
taxpayer’s estimate with other information provided by the applicant or other
approved electronic data sources. 107 If there is a discrepancy that would
affect the taxpayer’s eligibility for an APTC or the amount of the PTC (to the
extent the data is not “reasonable compatible” with the taxpayer’s
attestation), then the Marketplace is required to obtain additional
documentation from the taxpayer. 108
With respect to household income, if the taxpayer reports a higher
income than is supported by the federal data hub, the Marketplace generally
will not attempt further verification, but will use the higher income to
calculate the PTC and cost sharing subsidies. 109 This makes sense from the
perspective of the government’s budget because the higher income results in
lower benefits. An overstated income estimate that results in a significantly
lower APTC is a potential issue from a health-policy standpoint because it
104

45 C.F.R. § 155.320(c). If the identifying information for a household member
does not match the records at the IRS and HHS, the Marketplace must follow a particular
procedure to resolve the inconsistency. Id.
105
Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Preventing & Resolving Data-Matching
Issues in the Federally-Facilitated Marketplace, HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS, slides
2,
3
(Jan.
21,
2016),
http://www.healthreformbeyondthebasics.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Webinar-01-21-16_Resolving-Data-Matching-Issues.pdf [hereinafter
CBPP, Data Matching Issues].
106
45 C.F.R. § 155.320(c)(3)(i)(B).
107
45 C.F.R. § 155.320(c)(3)(i)(C), (D).
108
Id. The Marketplace is directed to perform additional due diligence if the
taxpayer’s application is not “reasonably compatible” with other available information. Id.
The Marketplace is directed that a taxpayer’s attestation is “reasonably compatible” with other
information if the difference or discrepancy between the data “does not impact the eligibility
of the applicant, including the amount of advance payments of the premium tax credit or
category of cost-sharing reductions.” 45 C.F.R. § 155.300(a).
109
CBPP, Data Matching Issues, supra note 105, at slide 38. As discussed supra in
note 108, the Marketplace is supposed to request additional documentation if the taxpayer’s
application is not “reasonably compatible” with the information in the federal data hub. This
should mean that the Marketplace would request additional information from an applicant that
attests to an income that results in a lower APTC than would appear to be supported based on
the historic information in the federal data hub. It is unclear whether or the extent to which the
Marketplace is doing this.
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might distort the taxpayer’s purchasing decision, causing the taxpayer to
select a more meager policy. However, it does not create a risk that the
taxpayer will have to repay excess APTC through the reconciliation process.
Thus, this Marketplace policy of not questioning an income overstatement is
reasonable with respect to the APTC. However, an overstated income
estimate that causes the taxpayer to be approved by the Marketplace for a
more meager cost sharing reduction than that which an accurate income
estimate would support is clearly a problem for the taxpayer. It is not
possible for the taxpayer to later claim cost sharing reductions that were
foregone. 110 Thus, it would be preferable from a policy standpoint for the
Marketplace to engage in some verification process of overstated income so
that the taxpayers’ rights to cost sharing reductions are protected.
If the taxpayer reports a household income at least 10% lower than
the income that is supported by the federal data hub, or if there is no data in
the federal data hub, then the Marketplace will ask the taxpayer for
additional documentation to support the lower income. 111 Additional
documentation is also required if the reported income is not “reasonably
consistent” with the income in the federal data hub. This means that if the
difference would affect eligibility for or the amount of the PTC or cost
sharing reductions, the Marketplace must seek to verify the income. 112 This
is called a “data matching issue.”
If a data matching issue arises, the taxpayer is granted temporary
eligibility for an APTC and cost sharing reductions based on the taxpayer’s
estimates for up to 90 days while the taxpayer gathers additional
documentation to support the estimates.113 If the taxpayer does not respond
within 90 days or fails to adequately verify the estimates, the taxpayer either
loses eligibility for any further APTC or cost sharing reductions or is granted
an APTC or cost sharing reduction based on the information from the federal
data hub. 114 The taxpayer can still claim any PTC not already paid in
advance on the tax return for that year. HHS may extend the 90 day period
for resolving data mismatches where “the applicant demonstrates that a good
faith effort has been made to obtain the required documentation during the
period.” 115 HHS has further authority to “provide an exception, on a case-by110
See Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms
for Health Insurance Subsidies, 65 TAX. L. REV. 723, 729 (2012).
111
CBPP, Data Matching Issues, supra note 105, at slide 38; Cent. for Medicare &
Medicaid Serv., Consumer Guide for Annual Household Income Data Matching Issues at 2-3,
(Oct. 2015), https://marketplace.cms.gov/outreach-and-education/household-income-datamatching-issues.pdf. [hereinafter CMS Consumer Guide].
112
CMS Consumer Guide, supra note 111, at 2-3. Again, this rule seems to conflict
with the rule requiring the Marketplace to accept a taxpayer’s higher income estimates. It is
unclear whether the Marketplace is engaging in any verification of higher income estimates,
even if the higher income is not “reasonably consistent” with the federal data hub.
113
CBPP, Data Matching Issues, supra note 105, at slides 5, 38.
114
CBPP, Data Matching Issues, supra note 105, at slide 49.
115
45 C.F.R. § 155.315(f)(3).
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case basis, to accept an applicant’s attestation as to the information which
cannot otherwise be verified” where an applicant “does not have
documentation with which to resolve the inconsistency . . . because such
documentation does not exist or is not reasonably available and for whom the
Exchange is unable to otherwise resolve the inconsistency,” except for data
mismatches related to citizenship or immigration status.” 116
Significantly, the Marketplace communicates to taxpayers that it
engages in data verification to “provide the correct financial assistance and
protect you against owing money back when you file your taxes.” 117 Thus,
while there are limited circumstances where the Marketplace defers to the
taxpayer’s income and household size estimates, the communicated message
to the taxpayer is that the Marketplace is verifying the information provided
and protecting the taxpayer from having to repay an excess APTC.
There is a statutorily-defined appeals process by which a taxpayer
can appeal Marketplace determinations. 118 While that appeals process is
important, it is not likely to be helpful to taxpayers who have been approved
for an overly-large APTC. It simply will not occur to the vast majority of
taxpayers to file an appeal asking for a lower subsidy amount than was
approved, and to do so could jeopardize CSR subsidies which are not subject
to reconciliation. In any event, taxpayers who recognize the problem would
be best served by simply taking less than the full amount of approved APTC
payments.
Once approved, a taxpayer is required to contact the Marketplace
within thirty days to report changes during the year that affect eligibility for
or the amount of the APTC or CSR subsidies. 119 Once the Marketplace
verifies the reported changed information, the Marketplace then adjusts the
APTC and CSR subsidies. 120 There does not appear to be any penalty for not
reporting changes.
III. COMPARING THE PTC WITH OTHER SOCIAL SUPPORT
PROGRAMS
It is instructive to compare the PTC with other social support
programs. The design and delivery of these programs hold valuable lessons
for redesigning the PTC (or in fashioning new health care subsidies). The list
of benefits examined in this Article is selective and not exhaustive. I have
chosen to focus on benefits that have intriguing similarities to the PTC in
purpose or design. The lessons that this Article chooses to describe also are
not exhaustive. More work in this area would be valuable.

116

45 C.F.R. § 155.315(g).
CMS Consumer Guide, supra note 111, at 3.
118
42 U.S.C. § 18081(f); 45 C.F.R. Part 155, Subpart F.
119
45 C.F.R. § 155.330(b).
120
45 C.F.R. § 155.330(g).
117
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A. Tax and Non-Tax Delivery Systems Generally
Debates and discussions about administrative methods of delivering
social welfare benefits have been ongoing for years. Since at least the advent
of the EITC, policy makers have chosen to deliver selected social welfare
benefits through the tax code, in sharp contrast to traditional public benefits
systems that rely on non-tax based administration. Advocates for tax-based
programs have argued that using the tax system is more administratively
efficient than traditional administration, and that the cost of delivering taxbased benefits is lower. 121 Advocates also have pointed out that delivering
benefits through the near-universal income tax system is less stigmatizing
and isolating than visiting the welfare office.122 Critics have pointed to laxer
enforcement in tax-based benefits 123 and the mismatch between the
enforcement mindset of the IRS and the needs of taxpayers for help with
compliance. 124 Some have pointed out that placing social benefit programs
within the tax system necessarily means compromise of some goals, such as
responsiveness to need, because of the structural limitations of the current
income tax system. 125 Yet others have been concerned that asking the IRS to
administer social welfare benefits is detrimental to the IRS’s primary mission
of revenue collection.126It is safe to say that there are pros and cons to taxbased administration, just as there are for non-tax based administration.
B. TANF (aka Welfare) and SNAP (aka Food Stamps)
Like the PTC, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”)
(formerly known as AFDC or welfare) and Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (“SNAP”) (formerly known as food stamps) are social
support programs that are means-tested. 127 TANF provides income support to
121
Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 564-565 (1995).
122
Id.
123
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income
Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1875 (2005) (noting that EITC enforcement efforts are
stricter than enforcement of other tax provisions, but far less strict than enforcement of nontax cash transfer programs, and concluding that perhaps this is a “price worth paying” for the
survival of the EITC).
124
Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net,
81 OR. L. REV. 351 (2002) (discussing the unique barriers that low-income taxpayers face
when dealing with the IRS audit and appeal process).
125
Alstott, supra note 121, at 564-565.
126
Kristen E. Hickman, Pursuing a Single Mission (Or Something Closer To It) for
the IRS, 7 COLUM. J. OF TAX L. 169 (2016) (arguing that “Congress’s repeated utilization of
the IRS to serve functions beyond its traditional revenue raising mission has reached a tipping
point that threatens to undermine substantially the viability of the IRS’s primary mission as
the national’s tax collector” and suggesting that the IRS be restructured by mission).
127
Code § 36B (premium tax credit); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (Block Grants to States
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036c (Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program).
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needy families (as well as serving other purposes), 128 and SNAP helps needy
families to purchase food.
Eligibility for and the amount of SNAP benefits are determined
based on monthly income and household composition. 129 Eligibility for and
the amount of TANF benefits also are commonly determined based on
monthly income and household composition, although there is some variety
because the TANF program operates as a federal block grant to the states. 130
The PTC, by contrast, is based on annualized income and household
composition. More frequent determinations of income and household size are
more intrusive than using annualized figures, but also are more responsive,
better reflecting current need for services. The PTC approximates the TANF
and SNAP system by requiring a taxpayer to report income and household
changes during the year to the Marketplace so that subsidies can be
adjusted. 131 However, the addition of a reconciliation requirement alters the
system fundamentally, reserving the bulk of verification and enforcement to
the end of the year.
TANF and SNAP are both prospective benefits. Eligibility for
payments and the amount of payments are determined by a government
agency in advance of receiving the payments. 132 While a taxpayer can appeal
128

This Article is focusing on the traditional TANF function of cash assistance,
which was the primary purpose of the predecessor program Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (“AFDC”) and is the programmatic support most people associate with TANF. Liz
Schott, LaDonna Paventti & Ife Floyd, How States Use Federal and State Funds under the
TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-8-15tanf_0.pdf. However, the TANF
program gives states fairly broad latitude to use grant funds for a variety of purposes that are
approved by the federal statute. Id. TANF’s approved purposes are to “(1) provide assistance
to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of
relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of
these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”
42 U.S.C. § 601(a). These purposes have supported traditional cash assistance payments, but
also state programs such as child care services, work training and placement activities, child
welfare programs, parenting training, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence services,
early education, teen pregnancy prevention programs, and state earned income tax credits.
Schott, Paventti & Floyd, supra.
129
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP): Fact Sheet on Resources, Income, and Benefits (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fact-sheet-resources-income-and-benefits.
130
See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Mission Dissonance in the TANF Program: Of Work,
Self-Sufficiency, Reciprocity, and the Work Participation Rate, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369,
395-96 (2012) (“As of 2003, monthly income eligibility criteria ranged from $256 in Alabama
to $1993 in Alaska.”); Alstott, supra note 121, at 580 (“Traditional income-transfer programs,
in contrast, typically measure income at much shorter intervals, usually monthly, in order to
maximize responsiveness to changing circumstances.”).
131
45 C.F.R. §§ 155.330(b), (g).
132
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (Block Grants to States for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036c (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program).
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these determinations, the determinations themselves are not preliminary or
estimated. 133 Future changes in circumstances can change the benefit
amount, but generally not retroactively. In the SNAP program, participants
are required to report changes at regular intervals (generally monthly or
quarterly), or they may be required to report changes as they occur.134 The
TANF programs rules vary because of the block grant nature of the program,
but usually follow the same pattern. 135
This contrasts with the PTC which is a retrospective benefit in the
form of a tax credit. Even though the PTC can be paid in advance, taxpayers
are subject to later reconciliation, which makes the advance payments more
like a loan than a prospective benefit. There are caps on the amount that
taxpayers with incomes under 400% of the FPL must repay, but everyone
with excess APTCs must repay something. Because Congress has already
twice raised the caps and there are proposals to eliminate the caps altogether,
it is unwise to rely on the caps to provide financial protection for
taxpayers.136 While overpayments of both SNAP and TANF payments can be
recovered by the state, the process is not structural and automatic like it is for
the APTC. States have discretion to not seek repayment of SNAP or TANF
payments and frequently do so when the overpayment was not the result of
fraud or abuse by the recipient.137
TANF (in the form of income support) provides cash payments
directly to beneficiaries while the APTC is paid directly to the insurance
company. When the TANF payment’s purpose is to provide income support,
this difference makes sense. Income support is sharply contrasted with the
APTC’s purpose of subsidizing a current purchase. Unlike TANF, SNAP
benefits are not paid in cash and cannot be converted to cash, but are paid as
an electronic benefit transfer card (like a voucher or a debit card) that can be
used at approved vendors to purchase approved food products. 138 In this way,
SNAP benefits are similar to APTC benefits. This makes sense because
SNAP benefits, unlike TANF but similar to the APTC, are designed to
support a particular, identified, current purchase.

133

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15.
7 C.F.R. § 273.12. See also U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance
Program
(SNAP):
Facts
about
SNAP
(Mar.
14,
2016),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/facts-about-snap [hereinafter USDA, Facts about SNAP].
135
See David Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, note 49 and accompanying text
(2004).
136
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. As with most things, how one views
the caps is a matter of perspective. Some may view the caps, as I do, as a mechanism for
tempering the financial risk of refundable credits that are payable in advance and tied to
credit-year income. Others view the caps as a forgiveness of tax that is rightly due, because of
the way the credit is calculated.
137
To receive a TANF block grant, the state must have “standards and procedures to
ensure against program fraud and abuse.” 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(6).
138
USDA, Facts about SNAP, supra note 134.
134
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Like TANF and SNAP, eligibility for and the amount of the APTC is
determined largely by a government official, with inputs from the
beneficiary. None of the programs rely exclusively (or even mainly) on self
reporting. Administrative protections for SNAP and TANF recipients are
similar. There is an administrative appeals process to contest negative
determinations. APTC determinations also are appealable. However, APTC
determinations, unlike TANF and SNAP, are preliminary or estimated in
nature. Moreover, because of the reconciliation requirement, it is less clear
when it makes sense for a taxpayer to contest a Marketplace’s APTC
determination. Unlike TANF and SNAP, where a winning appeal results in a
higher benefit, it is less clear what a good result is for the APTC. A taxpayer
may want to appeal a Marketplace seeking a higher advance subsidy, but that
could create a higher risk of repayment.
C. The EITC and the Now-Repealed Advance EITC
The EITC is the largest federal cash assistance poverty relief
program in the United States today. 139 It is a powerful tool for reducing
poverty among the lowest-level earners in American society. 140 The EITC is
a refundable tax credit equal to a certain percentage of a taxpayer’s “earned
income” (i.e., income from work), up to a certain dollar amount. While
childless taxpayers are eligible for a small EITC, the amount of the credit
increases dramatically for a taxpayer with children. The EITC is meanstested, and phases out as a taxpayer’s income rises. There have been regular
proposals for reform and improvement, 141 but the EITC is a successful and
139

In 2014, the federal government spent $60.1 billion on the refundable portion of
EITC, 34% of the entire outlay for all public assistance and related programs combined
($175.2 billion including the EITC). The second-largest needs-based cash assistance program
in 2014 was the supplemental security income program at $51.5 billion. In comparison, TANF
payments were only $20.4 billion in 2014. Other non-cash assistance programs are more
expensive. For example, the federal government spent $102.8 billion in 2014 on food and
nutrition assistance programs, including food stamps. U.S. Office of Management and Budget,
Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables, Table 11.3, Outlays for Payments
for
Individuals
by
Category
and
Major
Program:
1940-2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.
140
President Obama, in his 2014 State of the Union Address, explained that “few
[measures] are more effective at reducing inequality and helping families pull themselves up
through hard work than the Earned Income Tax Credit. Right now, it helps about half of all
parents at some point.” Barack Obama, U.S. President, President Barack Obama’s State of the
Union
Address
(Jan.
28,
2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address.
141
See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned
Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 520 (2013);
Kerry A. Ryan, EITC as Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 583 (2014); George K. Yin
et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the
Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994); Lawrence Zelenak,
Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum
Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301 (2004).
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popular program with largely bipartisan support. 142 It is easy to understand
why the EITC enjoys bipartisan support; the left appreciates the social
welfare aspect of the credit, while the right can stand behind the credit’s
encouragement to work. The EITC often is described as a payroll offset
measure, and indeed that has been a purpose since the beginning. 143
However, the EITC also was part of the welfare reform and welfare-to-work
movements. 144
Like the PTC, the EITC is a means-tested social welfare program.
Both are refundable tax credits. The purpose of the EITC is to provide
income support (like TANF) rather than to subsidize a specific purchase (like
SNAP benefits and the PTC). Both being income tax credits, a taxpayer has
142

See, e.g., Richard Rubin & Eric Morath, Obama, Ryan See Potential for a TaxPolicy Compromise, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-ryan-seepotential-for-a-tax-policy-compromise-1454417318 (noting agreement between President
Barack Obama (a Democrat) and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan (a Republican) on
expanding the EITC available to workers without qualifying children). The EITC, brainchild
of Senator Russell Long (a Democrat), was born as a compromise measure in response to
President Nixon’s (a Republican) proposed “negative income tax,” which would have
provided a small guaranteed income to everyone. Jane Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing
Poor Families: The Evolution of Treatment Under the Federal Income Tax, 7 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 35, 38 (2008); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 992
(2000). Despite having bipartisan support, the EITC is regularly criticized, sometimes for
being unsustainable “welfare,” sometimes for being expensive, sometimes for disincentivizing
marriage or (perversely) work and sometimes for a high rate of overpayments. See, e.g.,
STEVE HOLT, BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30: WHAT WE
KNOW 3 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2006/02/childrenfamilies-holt;
see also Book, supra note 124.
143
The House of Representatives included an EITC in the Tax Reduction Act of
1975. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, tit. II, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 30, 30–31
(1975) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The House Ways and Means Committee
indicated the purpose of the credit was to provide relief to earners with little or no tax liability
by providing a refundable tax credit based on earned income noting that the credit amount was
designed to “closely match [] the employee and employer social security tax on the first
$4,000 of income . . . .” H. REP. NO. 94-19, at 3 (1975). The committee also found that it was
“appropriate to use the income tax system to offset the impact of the social security taxes on
low-income persons . . . .” Id. at 29. The Senate Finance Committee agreed with the House
that it was appropriate to offset social security taxes through an income tax system. S. REP.
NO. 94-36, at 33 (1975).
144
While fully agreeing with the goal of offsetting payroll taxes for low wage
workers, the Senate Finance Committee had a different view of the scope of the new EITC. It
explained that “the most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in
encouraging people to obtain employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the
welfare rolls.” S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 33 (1975). Thus, the Senate proposed an amendment
increasing the amount of the credit and restricting the credit to “individuals who maintain a
household.” Id. at 34. The Senate wanted to offset payroll taxes, but only for those individuals
likely to be eligible for welfare payments if they were not working. It was a strategy for
moving families from welfare to work by making work more attractive than welfare (or at
least not more unattractive). The Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s version of the
EITC. H.R. REP. NO. 94-120, at 58-59 (1975). It passed Congress and was signed by President
Nixon.
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the same administrative and judicial rights with respect the denial of an EITC
or PTC claimed on a tax return, such as the right to a Notice of Deficiency
and access to the U.S. Tax Court. 145
The APTC is similar in many important ways to the Advance EITC
(“AEITC”), which was available from its introduction for tax year 1979 until
its repeal for tax year 2011. 146 Under the AEITC, certain taxpayers could
receive advance payments of their anticipated EITCs in their paychecks. To
claim the AEITC, the taxpayer would notify his or her employer by giving
the employer an IRS Form W-5. The Form W-5 asked the employee to
certify that he or she was eligible to receive an AEITC, asked what the
employee’s anticipated filing status was, and asked whether the employee’s
spouse also received an AEITC. 147 The employer would calculate the amount
of the AEITC based on the employee’s wages from the employer and IRS
tables, and then would include the calculated amount in the employee’s
paycheck. 148 Thus, like the APTC, the taxpayer was required to allow
another entity to calculate the amount of the advance credit payment, with
little self-reporting. Unlike the APTC, the AEITC process was not designed
to predict the final EITC amount with high accuracy, opting instead for
certainty and ease for the employers charged with administering the advance
payments.
Like the APTC, there was a reconciliation process. If the AEITC
payments received during the year turned out to be more than the EITC to
which the taxpayer was eligible on the tax return for that year, the taxpayer
was required to repay the excess amount. 149 Unlike the APTC, there were no
caps on repayment. 150 However, also unlike the APTC, the IRS limited the
total amount of AEITC payments that could be paid during the year to only a
portion of the anticipated EITC eligibility. 151 This feature limited the risk
that a taxpayer would face a repayment obligation, but also made the AEITC
much less responsive to the current income needs of taxpayers.152

145
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C., Subtitle F, Chapter 63, Subchapter B – Deficiency
Procedures in the Case of Income, Estate, Gift, and Certain Excise Taxes.
146
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. I, § 105, 92 Stat. 2763, 2773–76
(1978) (making the EITC permanent and adding advance payment option); Education Jobs
and Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 219, 124 Stat. 2389, 2403
(2010) (eliminating advance refundability of EITC).
147
I.R.S. Form W-5 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/fw5--2010.pdf.
148
I.R.S. PUB. 15, at 19-20 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p15--2010.pdf.
149
I.R.S. Form W-5 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/fw5--2010.pdf.
150
Id.
151
I.R.S. PUB. 15, at 19-20 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p15--2010.pdf.
Alstott, supra note 121, at 584 and notes 196-197 (noting that 1993 amendments “limit
advance payments for all recipients to sixty percent of the EITC benefit to a family with one
child” and further “limited advance payments by excluding from the advance payment system
the additional credit amounts for larger families, young children, and purchasers of health
insurance.”).
152
Id.
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A repayment obligation can occur even when the advance payments
are designed to be only a portion of the ultimate credit and even if income is
carefully estimated throughout the year. For example, under the AEITC
program, a taxpayer whose income increased at the end of the year could
have owed a repayment, even though the credit was designed to limit this
occurrence. 153 Proposals for correcting for these overpayment situations
generally focus on more accurate income calculations (which will likely add
complexity to the process for the taxpayer) or limiting the advance payments
(which reduces the responsiveness of the benefit to the taxpayer’s need). 154
The AEITC was repealed by Congress effective for tax year 2011.155
The principal reason was that the participation rates for the program were
persistently very low. 156 Evidence indicates that the low participation rates
occurred in part from not knowing about the availability of the AEITC
(despite IRS outreach efforts on this topic), but also from a general
preference by taxpayers for a lump sum benefit. 157 Taxpayers in general
seem to prefer lump sum refunds after filing a tax return over receiving
money throughout the year. 158 In part, this preference stems from a (perhaps
unacknowledged) preference for a forced saving program; in part, it is due to
a marked fear of owing money with the filing of a tax return.159
The APTC program should build on the lessons learned from the
AEITC experience. EITC recipients overwhelming opted out of receiving
153

Stephen D. Holt, Improvement of the Advance Payment Option of the Earned
Income Credit, 57 TAX NOTES 1583, 1585-1586 (1992) (identifying several situations which
create a risk of overpayment of an AEITC).
154
See, e.g., id. at 1587.
155
Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-226, §
219, 124 Stat. 2389, 2403 (2010).
156
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-92-26, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT:
ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTION IS NOT WIDELY KNOWN OR UNDERSTOOD BY THE PUBLIC 3 (1992)
[hereinafter GAO, ADVANCED PAYMENT OPTION] (noting that most taxpayers surveyed did not
know about the advance payment option, but that most would prefer a lump sum benefit in
any event); Book, supra note 124, at note 45 (noting that “[i]n 1998, 216,238 taxpayers, out of
the total 12.7 million who received the EITC, received the credit through advance payment; in
1999, only 185,027 out of 19.4 million EITC recipients received the credit through advance
payment; [and] in 2000, only 169,002 out of 19.2 million EITC recipients received the credit
through advance payment”).
157
GAO, ADVANCED PAYMENT OPTION, supra note 156, at 3 (noting that most
taxpayers surveyed did not know about the advance payment option, but that most would
prefer a lump sum benefit in any event); see also Stephen D. Holt, Periodic Payment of the
Earned Income Tax Credit Revisited, METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROG. AT BROOKINGS, 5 (Dec.
2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/12/17holt/holtperiodicpaymenteitc121515.pdf (citing as reasons for the failure of the AEITC its
“complexity, involvement of employers, and too-small disbursements”).
158
Greene, supra note 141, at 563 (describing the strategy used by many
respondents of intentionally over-withholding throughout the year in order to get a lump sum
refund after filing a tax return).
159
Greene, supra note 141, at 562 (“Respondents liked the forced-savings aspect of
the EITC lump sum, and they were afraid that if they took an advance on the money, they
would ultimately owe the IRS money at the end of the year.”).
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advance payments. This was possible in large part because the EITC is not
tied to particular, current spending. 160 PTC recipients do not have the luxury
of waiting for their benefits. PTC eligibility is conditioned on purchasing a
health insurance policy on the Marketplace. In 2016, $283 per month is the
average cost for a 40-year-old single person to buy the lowest cost silver
plan, before any subsidies. 161 That is an annual expense of $3,396. For
taxpayers with income in the range that would qualify them for a PTC,
between $11,770 (100% of the FPL) and $47,080 (400% of the FPL), 162 that
is a significant outlay; it represents 29% of annual income for a single person
living at the poverty line. It is unrealistic to expect such taxpayers to wait to
receive their PTC as the tradeoff for protecting themselves from having to
repay excess payments. If a single individual living at the poverty line
instead claimed just the average 2016 APTC amount of $291 per month, 163
(the actual subsidy amount is likely to be higher because our hypothetical
person has lower-than-average income), the out-of-pocket cost for health
coverage is $0 (because the PTC is higher than the cost of the insurance). If,
however, our hypothetical single person gets a much better paying job or an
unexpected bonus in December, or wins the lottery, or takes a lump sum
withdrawal from a 401(k) plan or IRA, or has phantom income like
cancellation on indebtedness, he or she will face a (perhaps unlimited)
repayment obligation and potential tax penalties. It is critical to recall that the
purpose of the APTC (and the PTC) is to induce lower-income individuals to
opt into the risk pool.
Another part of the reason the AEITC was not very responsive to the
needs of taxpayers was because the inputs used in the calculation of the
advance payments was simplified to make it easy for employers to
administer the payments. Employers simply used the employee’s pay for the
current pay period and looked up the advance payment amount in IRS
published tables. There were different tables for single employees, married
employees, and married employees whose spouse also was receiving an
AEITC. 164 This simplified method made the system palatable for employers,
who generally reported no significant difficulty in administering AEITCs. 165
160
However, the prevalence of high-cost refund anticipation loans (or RALS)
indicates a desire of taxpayers to accelerate year end lump sum EITCs. Holt, supra note 157,
2-3.
161
Cynthia Cox, Gary Claxton, & Larry Levitt, Potential Savings from Actively
Shopping for Marketplace Coverage in 2016, THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUND. (Nov 18, 2015),
http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/potential-savings-from-actively-shopping-formarketplace-coverage-in-2016/.
162
See supra note 27.
163
Cent. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., March 31, 2015 Effectuated Enrollment
Snapshot, (June 2, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Factsheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-06-02.html.
164
Holt, supra note 153, at 1584.
165
GAO, ADVANCED PAYMENT OPTION, supra note 156, at 4; but see Holt, supra
note 153, at 1584 (noting the employers who were aware of the AEITC “often are confused
about their responsibilities and liabilities”).

30

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ___:__

However, it too often resulted in an AEITC that was not well matched with
the EITC to which the taxpayer was ultimately entitled. 166
The APTC system has much better inputs of information (although
skewed toward historical information), which in theory should result in more
accurate estimates. However, the inputs are complex and at least as an initial
matter are self-reported. This is concerning in terms of accuracy. The
average taxpayer will likely rely heavily on the Marketplace to confirm that
the income estimate is accurate, just as the average taxpayer relies heavily on
paid preparers to accurately file a tax return that claims an EITC. 167 Indeed,
this is precisely what the Marketplace claims to do for taxpayers; as the
Marketplace’s own consumer information claims, “The Marketplace asks
you to document your annual household income so that it can provide the
correct financial assistance and protect you against owing money back when
you file your taxes.” 168
D. The Health Coverage Tax Credit and the Advance Payment Option
The Health Coverage Tax Credit (“HCTC”) became effective in
2002, and is similar in design to the PTC and APTC. The HCTC can in a
very real sense be called a precursor program for the PTC, although the
HCTC now coexists and is coordinated with the PTC. 170 The HCTC is a
refundable tax credit that helps to offset the cost of health coverage for
displaced workers receiving Trade Adjustment Assistance payments and
early retirees receiving Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation payments. 171
The credit covers 72.5% of the cost of qualifying health coverage, typically
COBRA coverage and state-qualified insurance plans and (for 2014 and
2015 only) Marketplace plans. 172 While a taxpayer can wait to claim the
169

166

Holt, supra note 153, at 1585.
About 70% of all tax returns with an EITC are filed by commercial tax preparers.
PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS:
SIMPLIFICATION,
COMPLIANCE,
AND
CORPORATE
TAXATION
3
(2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf
[hereinafter PERAB].
168
CMS Consumer Guide, supra note 111, at 3.
169
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-210, div. A, tit. II, 116 Stat. 933, 954-960 (2001)
(codified at Code § 35). The HCTC program was allowed to expire at the end of 2013, but in
2015 it was modified, reinstated retroactively to 2014, and extended through tax year 2019.
Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-27, § 407, 129 Stat. 362, 381-83
(2015).
170
Code § 35(g)(12) (a taxpayer who elects to take a HCTC for a coverage month
may not take a PTC for the same month).
171
Code § 35. See also BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44392,
THE HEALTH COVERAGE TAX CREDIT (HCTC): IN BRIEF (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44392.pdf.
172
Id. The HCTC subsidy amount originally covered 65% of the cost of coverage,
was raised to 80% in 2009, and was lowered to the current 72.5% by the extension legislation,
with the rest of the premium amount (currently 27.5%) to be paid by the taxpayer regardless
of income level. FERNANDEZ, supra note 171. Whether or not this compares favorably or
167
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credit on the tax return for the year,173 there is an option to have the credit
paid in advance directly to the insurer.174
Significantly, if the taxpayer elects advance payments of the HCTC,
there is no reconciliation process. Eligibility is confirmed by the IRS upon
enrollment in the advance payment program. 175 If a taxpayer receives
advance HCTC payments, but was actually ineligible, there is no automatic
process as part of filing a tax return that results in the taxpayer repaying
those amounts. This stands in sharp contrast with the PTC reconciliation
process. A taxpayer who has been approved by the IRS for advance payment
of HCTC can rely on the amount of that credit. Absent fraud, the taxpayer
will not have to repay it. It is tempting to believe that the difference exists
because eligibility is clearer under the HCTC than the PTC. However, the
IRS’s advance HCTC program engages in administratively burdensome steps
to ensure continuing eligibility of the taxpayers enrolled. For example, the
IRS collects the taxpayer’s premium payments and forwards them timely to
the insurance company to ensure that the taxpayer is actively enrolled in the
insurance. The costs of this type of administration are high, compared with
relying on reconciliation to catch overpayments. 176 But it is a system that
proactively prevents overpayments. Furthermore, it is reliable for the
taxpayer, unlike the APTC. I suspect that this difference exists because
eligibility for an HCTC and the amount of the HCTC do not vary based on
household income, unlike the PTC. Because the PTC is based in part on
income, I believe the Congress, somewhat reflexively, assumed it should be

poorly to the subsidies available under the PTC, where a taxpayer’s contribution can be as
high as between 6% and 9.5% of income, depends on the details of the taxpayer’s particular
situation. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
173
The taxpayer must attach Form 8885 to his or her return as well as documents
showing that the coverage was qualified and that the taxpayer paid the premium. I.R.S.,
Instructions for Form 8885, at 5 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8885.pdf.
174
Code §§ 35, 7527. Note that although the current text of Code § 7527 has an
effective date after the enactment of the 2015 extension legislation, prior versions of Code §
7527 also allowed advance payments. Because of the retroactive reinstatement of the credit,
however, advance payments were not available for tax years 2014 or 2015. The IRS is
currently finalizing an interim system for authorizing and paying advance credit payments for
2016, expected to be active July 2016, and a final program for 2017 through 2019. I.R.S.,
Health Coverage Tax Credit (last updated May 26, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/creditsdeductions/individuals/hctc (noting that “the IRS expects to implement a limited interim
process this summer for making advance monthly payments in 2016” and that “[t]he IRS
expects to implement the full advance monthly payment program in January 2017 and will
provide more information about the enrollment process later this year”); I.R.S., Instructions
for Form 8885, at 1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8885.pdf (noting that “[m]onthly
advance payments of the HCTC are planned to begin in July 2016”).
175
FERNANDEZ, supra note 171, at 6.
176
Stan Dorn, Health Coverage Tax Credits: A Small Program Offering Large
INST.,
at
(Feb.
2008),
Policy
Lessons,
URBAN
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411608-Health-CoverageTax-Credits.PDF (“As of 2006, $1 in IRS administrative costs was required to deliver each $5
in HCTC subsidies.”).
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based on credit-year income, because that is the model followed by other tax
credits, like the EITC. Once you add an advance payment feature in,
reconciliation seems like an obvious next step. But credit-year income is not
necessarily the best benchmark for measuring the credit.177
The Code requires that “income” be measured on a tax year basis
and, while it can be calculated using any method of accounting that “clearly
reflect[s] income,” a taxpayer’s “income” is the figure shown on the return at
the end of that year which reflects an annual measurement of income. 178
While this is a very ingrained tax concept, it really is a rule of administrative
convenience. 179 Income must be measured somehow, and it is easier to
administer an income tax system that measures income retroactively based
on a tax year rather than a system that measures income in a variable way.180
However, measuring income retroactively based on a tax year is not an
immutable feature of the Code. Where other considerations (such as equity
or the advancement of substantive policy goals) outweigh administrative
convenience, Congress can and should opt for different measurements of
income.
The take up rate in the HCTC program historically has been very
low, meaning that many of the people eligible for the credit do not claim
it. 181 One commentator estimated that in 2006, only twelve to fifteen percent
of eligible households elected coverage.182 Commonly cited reasons for the
low take up rate are (1) that the program is not generous enough to make
insurance affordable, (2) that the individual must enroll in coverage and start
making premium payments before the advance payments begin, (3) that
enrollment in the program is complex, and (4) that many participants find the
insurance to be of little value. 183 A high take up rate for the PTC is critical

177

Zelenak, supra note 110, at 731.
Code § 441(a) (“Taxable income shall be computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s
taxable year,” which for individuals is almost always the calendar year); Code § 446
(requiring that the accounting method used “clearly reflect income” and specifically
authorizing use of the cash and accrual accounting methods).
179
Joseph M. Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing and
Liabilities, Or Why the Accrual Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 VA. TAX REV. 245, note 243
(2006) (describing both the accrual and cash methods of annual accounting as “realization
systems based on convenience”); Myron C. Grauer, The Supreme Court’s Approach to Annual
and Transactional Accounting for Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory
System? 21 GA. L. REV. 329, 337 (1986) (noting that “an ideal tax system would measure
income over lifespans,” but that “[p]ractical considerations preclude that, so annual
accounting has been adopted for administrative convenience”); Matthew A. Melone, Adding
Insult to Injury: the Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Clawback of Executive
Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 76 (2010) (“The annual accounting concept is an artifice
borne out of administrative convenience.”).
180
Id.
181
Dorn, supra note 176.
182
Id. at 2.
183
Id. at 2-3.
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for success of health reform overall; it is important that the PTC do its job of
enticing people into the health insurance risk pools.
The PTC compares favorably against the HCTC as to affordability
and liquidity. Because the PTC is income based, and because the taxpayer’s
share of the premium is limited to a sliding percentage of income,
Marketplace insurance should be considered relatively affordable. 184 The
APTC program has taken a different approach than the HCTC program, and
APTC subsidies begin upon application, even if there is a data mismatch. 185
Thus, there is no initial liquidity problem, like in the HCTC program where
an individual might have to pay as many as three months of premiums in full
before subsidies begin. 186
Whether enrollment in a Marketplace plan (with an APTC) is more
or less complex than enrollment in the HCTC program is hard to determine.
However, commentators generally agree that easier enrollment equates with
higher take up rates. The ACA adopted several features in an attempt to
make enrollment customer friendly. For example, a single application is used
to screen for both Medicaid and PTC eligibility. 187 Also, enrollment
assistance is provided through multiple platforms, including call centers,
websites, and in-person community-based navigators, and education and
outreach programs are required. 188 However, the process has been plagued
with problems from the outset, from the Marketplace website not working

184

There have been transition pains, however, that have led many to conclude that
Marketplace coverage is out of reach. Many people who were on less generous individual
plans pre-ACA commonly had those plans cancelled by the insurance companies, leaving the
insured to shop for more expensive (but more generous) coverage on the Marketplaces. See
Juan Williams, Insurance Cancelled? Don’t Blame Obama or the ACA, Blame America’s
NEWS
(Nov.
5,
2013),
Insurance
Companies,
FOX
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/11/05/insurance-cancelled-dont-blame-obama-or-acablame-america-insurance-companies.html; Jon R. Gabel, Ryan Lore, Roland D. McDevitt,
Jeremy D. Pickreign, Heidi Whitmore, Michael Slover, & Ethan Levy-Forsythe, More Than
Half Of Individual Health Plans Offer Coverage That Falls Short Of What Can Be Sold
Through Exchanges As Of 2014, HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 2012) (“More than half of Americans
who had individual insurance in 2010 were enrolled in plans that would not qualify as
providing essential coverage under the rules of the exchanges in 2014.”). In addition, there is
concern that Marketplace premiums will inevitably be steep. See Cynthia Cox, Gary Claxton,
Larry Levitt, Michelle Long, Selena Gonzales, & Nolan Sroczynski, Analysis of 2017
Premium Changes and Insurer Participation in the Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance
Marketplaces, THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUND. (June 2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/IssueBrief-Analysis-of-2017-Premium-Changes-and-Insurer-Participation-in-the-ACAMarketplaces (predicting a higher increase in premiums for 2017 than in prior years, but
noting that the data are preliminary). However, even if premiums rise very high for
Marketplace plans, because the PTC subsidies are tied to taxpayer income, the government
would shoulder most of the increase for subsidized policies.
185
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
186
Dorn, supra note 176, at 3.
187
42 C.F.R. § 435.907.
188
45 C.F.R. § 155.205.

34

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ___:__

for weeks after its official rollout, 189 to enrollees getting bounced back and
forth between the federally-facilitated Marketplace and state Medicaid
agencies, 190 to enrollees receiving very confusing requests for documents to
verify information provided on the application. 191 Part of the problem surely
lies with the involvement in the process of so many players: multiple federal
agencies, state agencies, state quasi-agencies, and non-profit organizations
all have a role to play in Marketplace enrollment. If the technical problems
can be adequately addressed, enrollment for APTCs should be relatively easy
from the individual’s perspective. 192 The government continues to work on
these technical problems, and it appears that the process is improving, but
more work is needed. 193 Importantly, I think it would be a mistake to make
enrollment easier by loosening APTC verification requirements. Making it
easier to get an APTC, but increasing the risk of a reconciliation problem
will negatively impact take up in the long run. Regrettably, this seems to be
HHS’s current approach. HHS recently announced that for 2017 with respect
to the federally-facilitated marketplace, a taxpayer will be required to verify
claimed income if it is lower than the (largely historical) information
contained in the federal data hub, but only if the discrepancy is more than the
greater of 25% or $6,000. 194 This is down from the 10% lower tolerance
levels in 2014 through 2016, which itself was a loosening of the standard

189

Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama Admits Web Site Flaws on Health Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/politics/obama-pusheshealth-law-but-concedes-web-site-problems.html?pagewanted=all.
190
Seanna Adcox, Despite Claims, Healthcare.Gov Is Not Enrolling Applicants in
Medicaid, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/LatestNews-Wires/2013/1205/Despite-claims-healthcare.gov-is-not-enrolling-applicants-inMedicaid.
191
Chabeli Herrera, Paperwork Inconsistencies Causing South Floridians, Others
HERALD
(June
16,
2015),
To
Lose
Obamacare
Subsidies,
MIAMI
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/health-care/article24665932.html.
192
It is worth noting that a highly functional coordinated system that links federal
and state agencies as well as non-profits and other entities involved in administering social
support systems could prove exceptionally valuable in streamlining our social support system.
A coordinated network could make enrollment and administration more efficient and cost
effective and could help to combat fraud and abuse. See Terri Shaw, Unlocking the Potential
of the ACA’s “No Wrong Door”, GOVERNING (November 11, 2014),
http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-affordable-care-act-potential-no-wrongdoor-a-87-exception.html (advocating for states to leverage federal money available to
modernize their health and human services eligibility systems to “promote horizontal
integration across a full spectrum of federal, state and local health and social-services
programs.”).
193
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-238, HEALTHCARE.GOV: CMS HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS, BUT NEEDS TO FURTHER IMPLEMENT SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT BEST PRACTICES 13 (Mar. 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668834.pdf.
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CENT. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Annual Income Threshold Adjustment
FAQ
(July
21,
2016),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-andFAQs/Downloads/FINAL-Income-Datamatching-FAQ-7-21-16.pdf
[hereinafter,
CMS,
Annual Income Threshold].
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established in the statute. 195 HHS stated that the change is expected to
“improve the customer experience in the Marketplace” yet “maintain[]
program integrity.” 196 With reconciliation looming to catch the overpayments
this approach will generate, the strategy appears more to be kicking the can
down the road.
The final factor in the low take up rate in the HCTC was that the
coverage available was not valued by the potential participants. Many
participants (pre-ACA) had gaps in coverage that meant the imposition of
preexisting condition exclusions. 197 Some states offered only high deductible
plans; others offered only high-premium low-deductible plans. 198 Many of
these prior concerns have been greatly alleviated by the protections put into
place by the ACA, such as the elimination of preexisting condition
exclusions, the adoption of modified community rating, and the requirement
to offer minimum essential benefits. However, there is concern that the
policies available on the Marketplace commonly have narrow networks and
high cost sharing, making the policies generally less expensive but also less
protective of health.199 HHS and the states need to keep a close watch on the
policies offered on the Marketplace and take the steps necessary to ensure
that the coverage is actually valuable to the insured people.
E. The ACA’s Cost Sharing Reduction Subsidies
Recall from infra Section II.B.5 that CSR subsidies are available to
taxpayers between 100% and 250% of the FPL who meet requirements for
an APTC and who are enrolled in a silver level Marketplace plan. The
subsidy is paid directly to the insurance company who places the taxpayer in
a special reduced-cost-sharing insurance plan. The insured person never
experiences a reconciliation process similar to the PTC and will never have
to repay any portion of the cost sharing reductions that he or she receives
(absent fraud). The insurance companies go through a reconciliation process
where the estimates are compared against actual expenses. Eligibility for the
CSR subsidies is determined by the Marketplace using the same process as
eligibility for the APTC.
It is intriguing that Congress passed in the same act two provisions
(the PTC and the CSR subsidies) that subsidize individual taxpayers, both of
which are tied to the individual’s income in terms of eligibility and amount
195

See supra Section II.B.5.
CMS, Annual Income Threshold, supra note 194.
197
Dorn, supra note 176, at 3.
198
Id.
199
Dan Polsky & Janet Weiner, LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECON., The
Skinny on Narrow Networks in Health Insurance Marketplace Plans 1 (June 2015),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf421027;
Suzanne
McGee, Obamacare Premiums And Deductibles Going Up – But It’s Still Better Than Before,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/money/us-moneyblog/2015/nov/20/obamacare-premiums-deductibles-increase-health-care.
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of subsidy, but chose to designate one as a tax “ with required reconciliation
and to designate the other as a “non-tax” subsidy with no required
reconciliation. Professor Zelenak has speculated that perhaps Congress
viewed reconciliation of the CSR subsidies as too administratively complex
and thus costly, but did not have similar concerns with respect to
reconciliation of the PTC. 200 While it is true that reconciling the actual use of
cost sharing reductions (which means tracking each copay, coinsurance, and
deductible dollar for each insured) is much more complicated than
calculating a tax credit, I am is not convinced that this adequately explains
Congress’s choice. CMS currently is embarking on exactly the sort of
complicated, costly reconciliation process that Congress supposedly wanted
to avoid, but with the insurance companies rather than individuals. 201 Indeed,
the timeline for this reconciliation keeps being pushed back because of the
complicated nature of the data to be submitted, first from April 2015 (for the
2014 year) to April 2016 (for the 2014 and 2015 years) and now to June
2016. 202 On the other hand, it is probable that the costs will be less (although
still high) for reconciling accounts with insurance companies (which are
fewer in number and which have greater expertise) than for reconciling
accounts with the covered individuals themselves. Perhaps administrative
complexity is at least part of the reason for the difference, but that seems like
a weak reason for such a big difference. Professor Zelenak was not
convinced either, but could think of no other explanation. 203 I suspect this is
a simple case of a difference that lacks a reason; Congress simply did not
think about it, and the ACA did not go through the normal conference
committee process that might have highlighted the issue. 204
200

Zelenak, supra note 110, at 731.
CMS, Draft Manual, supra note 85, at 5.
202
Id.; CENT. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Data Submission Deadline For
Cost-Sharing
Reduction
Reconciliation
(Apr.
15,
2016),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/Guidance-ondata-submission-deadlline-for-CSR-reconciliation-Final-4_15_16.pdf. If the House succeeds
in its challenge of the CSR subsidies, it is likely that reconciliation will never happen.
203
Zelenak, supra note 110, at 738 (“No other explanation for the difference –
satisfying or otherwise – comes to mind.”).
204
The ACA passed the House and Senate when Democrats had a majority in the
House and the sixty-vote majority needed to break a filibuster in the Senate. Earlier in the
Congressional session, Senator Edward Kennedy, a Democrat and life-long proponent for
health care reform, had passed away. Before the House and Senate versions could go to
conference committee to work out the differences, a Republican was elected in a special
election to fill Senator Kennedy’s seat, meaning that the Democrats no longer had the
supermajority votes necessary to break a Senate filibuster. It was anticipated that a conference
committee bill would be blocked in the Senate by filibuster. Thus, the House adopted wordfor-word the Senate version that had been passed before Senator Kennedy’s replacement was
elected, the House made some limited amendments through the budget reconciliation process,
and the Senate approved the budget reconciliation changes with a simple majority vote
because those type of changes could not be filibustered. See Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F.
Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under
the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 124–27 (2013).
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Importantly for the thesis of this Article, the CSR subsidies illustrate
another model for delivering benefits to individuals – the “tax-related”
benefit. Most commentators have focused on the difference between
delivering benefits outside the tax code or through the tax code. 205 The CSR
subsidies are a hybrid, though. They are tied in meaningful ways to tax
concepts, relying on tax dependents to define the household and modified
adjusted gross income to define income, but they are not claimed or
reconciled on a tax return.206 They also represent a new form of collaborative
administration, involving more than one federal agency, which may prove to
be an effective model, allowing agencies more freedom to focus on their core
competencies.207 The CSR subsidies work a bit like TANF and SNAP, in that
an individual is determined to be eligible and then prospectively provided
with benefits that are reliable in amount. But they are tied to eligibility for a
tax credit (the PTC). The CSR subsidies have high take up, because the
process is almost invisible to the taxpayer; take up rates are likely to be
higher once taxpayers understand that CSR subsidies are available in silver
plans only. 208 If a taxpayer is determined to be eligible for an APTC
(whether or not the taxpayer elects to actually take an APTC) and if the
taxpayer meets the other criteria, the Marketplace directs the insurance
company to place the taxpayer in a reduced cost sharing plan. From that
point forward, the taxpayer experiences no difference in using a reduced cost
sharing plan versus using a standard plan.
IV. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE PTC
The PTC is a critically important part of the plan for achieving nearuniversal health coverage. Having the broadest possible participation in the
risk pool ultimately should lower health insurance costs for everyone,
allowing for a true spreading of risk among a large group of people, the very
function of insurance. In order for the PTC to serve its function, it needs to
be properly designed so that taxpayers will opt into the system. With that
broad goal in mind, and with an understanding of the target population, the
PTC should (1) be sufficiently large that insurance is considered affordable
205

See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 121.
It is very unclear whether or to what extent the administrative functions related to
the CSR subsidies, or future “tax-related” benefits, will follow the tax model or the
Administrative Procedures Act model. See James M. Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism,
49 GA. L. REV. 1067 (2015) (comparing and no contrasting the features of tax administration
and other agency administration). An analysis of this question would be a valuable project.
207
Zelenak, supra note 110, at 739. Whether the current allocation of responsibility
for the PTC program are ideal is a separate question and open to debate.
208
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by its users, (2) be relatively simple to claim, without undue stigma and with
sufficient enrollment support, (3) be currently available to offset the current
cost of insurance, (4) be stable and not create additional financial risk for its
users, and (5) have adequate and efficient enforcement to address fraud and
abuse (recognizing that it is impossible, or at least financially infeasible, to
eliminate all fraud and abuse).
A. The PTC Should Be Sufficiently Large That Insurance Is Considered
Affordable By Its Users
The PTC should be sufficiently large that insurance is considered
affordable by its users. As experience with the HCTC demonstrates, when a
benefit or tax credit is conditioned on the taxpayer incurring an expense,
taxpayers will use the benefit only if the net cost of the expense is actually
affordable and fits within their budgets. The HCTC was (and remains)
largely underutilized in part because the subsidy left too large an out-ofpocket cost for the taxpayers to absorb. 209
The current design of the PTC does reasonably well in this regard.
The amount of the credit is variable and takes into account the actual cost of
available health plans and the taxpayer’s income, ensuring that taxpayers pay
no more than a certain percentage of their income (between 2% and 9.5%)
toward a benchmark silver plan. Reasonable minds might differ regarding
whether the credit is too generous or too meager. Some taxpayers might still
subjectively find their portion of the premium unaffordable. However,
because the PTC is calibrated to the specific characteristics of the taxpayer, it
is more responsive than other programs, like the HCTC, that use one-sizefits-all subsidy amounts.
B. The PTC Should Be Relatively Simple To Claim
The PTC should be relatively simple to claim. This includes having
sufficient enrollment support and, to the extent possible, reducing any stigma
associated with claiming the benefit. One of the reasons why the HCTC was
underutilized was that it was complex to claim, involving paperwork filed
with multiple government agencies. 210 One of the theories behind why
benefits delivered through the tax code tend to have higher take up rates than
non-tax-delivered benefits is that there is little stigma involved. 211 Most
209

The HCTC faced low participation rates by those eligible in part because the
credit required that the trade-displaced worker pay 35% of the premium cost, which many
found unaffordable. Dorn, supra note 176, at 2-3.
210
See supra note 188 and accompanying text. When individualized assistance was
available for claiming the HCTC, for example through labor unions, participation rates were
significantly higher. Dorn, supra note 176, at 2-3.
211
Barak Y. Orbach, Unwelcome Benefits: Why Welfare Beneficiaries Reject
Government Aid, 24 LAW & INEQ. 107, 151 (2006) (“Choices among forms of benefits may
mitigate self-esteem related costs, since some benefits are perceived to be more legitimate
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people file tax returns whereas few people visit the welfare office, and the
negative image of the “welfare queen” looms over those who would claim
needs-based benefits. 212 Additionally, there is a robust private and public
system in place for helping taxpayers to file tax returns. Claiming a benefit
by visiting H&R Block, side by side with more affluent people, is
normalizing.
In some respects, the PTC is relatively simple to claim, but in other
respects, the process is very opaque and difficult to navigate. A taxpayer can
claim the APTC at the same time and in the same place that he or she is
enrolling for health care coverage, which is efficient and convenient. The
PTC program’s incorporation of a one-stop-shop Marketplace for enrollment
and the availability of a variety of enrollment assistance both are admirable
design improvements. Reconciliation of the APTC, or claiming a regular
credit, occurs through the filing of a tax return. Because most Americans file
income tax returns annually, either because they are required to or because
they are claiming a refundable credit or a return of over-withholding, an
entire industry exists to help taxpayers file returns, including free services to
help older and low-income taxpayers. 213
However, the process for estimating an APTC based on annualized
credit-year income with later reconciliation is difficult. A taxpayer who
claims the APTC must submit documentation to the Marketplace to support
the income estimate. As noted above, this includes detailed information
about the makeup of the household, whether those household members are
tax dependents, and information on current income. None of this information
is particularly easy to gather, and the Marketplaces reportedly have been
than others and may even be culturally encouraged. For example, tax benefits that are less
observable than other benefits, are rather welcome by individuals, and tend to minimize the
costs of redistribution.”).
212
Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming The Welfare Queen: Feminist And Critical Race
Theory Alternatives To Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 257, 277278 (2016).
213
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-467T, PAID TAX RETURN
PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SIGNIFICANT ERRORS, STATEMENT OF
JAMES R. MCTIGUE, JR., DIRECTOR STRATEGIC ISSUES, 1 (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662356.pdf (“In tax year 2011 -- the most recent data available
-- paid preparers completed approximately 56 percent of all individual tax returns filed.”);
PERAB, supra note 167, at 3 (about 70% of all tax returns with an EITC are filed by
commercial tax preparers). The IRS has long supported access to free tax preparation services
for low-income taxpayers through its Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax
Counseling for the Elderly (TCE) programs. For the 2012 filing season, the IRS awarded $12
million in grants to 213 VITA organizations in all 50 states. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
TAX ADMIN., REP. NO. 2012-40-049, ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE
VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM REACHES MORE UNDERSERVED
TAXPAYERS (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201240049fr.html.
In 2011, VITA sites prepared over one million returns. Id. In addition, the IRS has partnered
with tax software companies to provide free access to tax preparation software to lowerincome taxpayers. See Free File: Do Your Federal Taxes for Free, I.R.S.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/free-file-do-your-federal-taxes-for-free (last visited June 23, 2016).
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doing a poor job of making sensible documentation requests and in
communicating those requests to taxpayers. 214 The complicated process of
applying for an APTC could well drive some taxpayers away from
purchasing insurance on the Marketplaces; studies have shown that such
“psychological frictions” result in eligible taxpayers foregoing EITCs. 215
This is exactly the opposite result from what good health policy would
dictate. The PTC exists to entice people to elect into the risk pool. If the
design of the PTC is pushing people away from the risk pool, the PTC is not
well designed. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that there is adequate
enforcement to avoid overpayments and outright fraud.
C. The PTC Should Be Currently Available To Offset the Current Cost of
Insurance
The PTC should be currently available to offset the current cost of
insurance. Again, the HCTC provides valuable insight into this goal. Even
though the HCTC was available in advance form, there was a lag time
between enrolling for health coverage and starting premium payments and
the advance payments beginning. 216 This requirement of paying up-front
costs was simply not possible for many potential enrollees. Recent research
has demonstrated the very small margin that most lower-income people have
in their budget to weather unexpected expenses. 217 Because enrolling in
health insurance creates a current expense, and because the PTC is aimed at
lower-income individuals whose budgets likely could not easily absorb that
extra cost, it is very important that the PTC be available ratably, to
concurrently offset the expense incurred. Requiring taxpayers to incur a large
expense and wait up to a year for reimbursement is impractical for most of
the targeted taxpayers. If the goal is to encourage taxpayers to opt into the
risk pool, the PTC must work for them. The credit’s current design achieves
this goal quite well, and any redesign must preserve this feature.

214
Daniel Chang and Nick Madigan, Consumers Asked To Verify Income, Other
Information – Or Risk Losing Government Subsidies For Health Insurance, MIAMI HERALD
(July
31,
2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1977462.html.
215
Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the
Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 4 (Nov. 2015) (exploring the role of “‘psychological frictions’ associated with
low program awareness, confusion, or an aversion to program complexity or hassles” in
failure to claim EITC benefits). Empirical work is needed to determine the extent to which
taxpayers are opting out of the insurance risk pools because of the complicated process of
applying for an advance credit.
216
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
217
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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D. The PTC Should Be Stable and Not Create Additional Financial Risk
for Its Users
The PTC should be stable and not create additional financial risk for
its users. This lesson is most clearly demonstrated by experience with the
AEITC. Taxpayers avoided claiming the AEITC in part because of the risk
of having to repay excess amounts at tax time. 218 This effect could be
considered tolerable in the EITC program because the “forced savings”
aspect of a lump sum EITC can be seen as a valuable policy goal in and of
itself and is valued by participants. 219 However, it is unacceptable for the
PTC, which subsidizes a current purchase. Too many taxpayers may opt not
to purchase health insurance, especially if they have had to repay APTCs in
the past. 220
The PTC fails miserably on this measure of design effectiveness.
Because the APTC (paid ratably over the year) is only an estimate (more like
a loan than a credit), it is highly likely that there will be adjustments during
the subsequent reconciliation process. Indeed, the IRS estimates that about
4.8 million people who were enrolled in a Marketplace plan in 2014 were
eligible for a PTC and reported that 97% of the taxpayers who filed a timely
2014 return claiming a PTC received an advance payment of the credit.221
The IRS further reported that 51% of PTC claimants in 2014 faced
repayment obligations, 41% received PTC credits on their returns higher than
the advance payments, and only 8% claimed PTCs equal to the advance
payments received. 222 Only about 26% of those reporting a repayment
obligation were affected by the repayment caps.223 Thus, the evidence from
the 2014 filing season supports what seems instinctively true: it is a difficult
task to accurately predict annual income. That makes the use of credit-year
income particularly troubling for a tax credit payable in advance with later
reconciliation.
To the extent the taxpayer’s APTC was underestimated, the taxpayer
will receive a refund of the excess. Thus, ultimately, the taxpayer receives
the full amount of credit for which he or she is eligible. However, the timing
of the payment is not ideal from a health policy standpoint. The PTC is
intended to support the purchase of health insurance, and the decisions about
218

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
220
Anecdotally, this appears to be a common response the first time a taxpayer
discovers that they owe back all or a portion of their APTC payments. Again anecdotally,
responses fall either into the “the government did something wrong and took away my
benefits” camp or the “I must have done something wrong” camp. Both responses create real
problems. The first camp will feel cheated by their government and might be more inclined to
cheat themselves in the future to make up for the perceived slight. The second camp may opt
to forego benefits altogether.
221
Letter from John Koskinen to Members of Congress, supra note 4.
222
Id.
223
Id.
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whether or not to buy insurance, and which policy to buy, occur over a year
earlier than the payment of the excess PTC in the year of reconciliation.
Thus, the taxpayer’s decisions about purchasing insurance are skewed to the
extent that the Marketplace underestimates the APTC. The likely result in
many cases will be taxpayers choosing more meager coverage than they
could otherwise afford, or in extreme cases, deciding that they cannot afford
coverage at all, even with the (under)estimated credit. 224 This is precisely the
type of risk that the ACA sought to remedy – the risk of being un- or underinsured.
A different problem arises when the Marketplace overestimates the
amount of the APTC. Taxpayers who receive too large an APTC because the
estimate was off must repay some or all of the excess when they file a
reconciliation tax return. 225 While the caps for taxpayers between 100% and
400% of the FPL help to alleviate some of the financial burden, a taxpayer in
that range of income will likely find it difficult to weather a sudden and
unexpected debt like that. Studies document that most Americans do not
have savings sufficient to pay even relatively small unexpected expenses.226
Further, there is potentially a large cliff effect for a taxpayer whose income is
at or above 400% of the FPL. 227 For those taxpayers, there is no repayment
cap, and just a few extra dollars of income could push them over 400% of the
FPL and from a repayment cap of $2,500 to unlimited repayment. 228 While it
is possible that the repayment obligation will lower a tax refund that was
otherwise due and not actually result in a bill that must be paid, this means
that the PTC repayment obligation is eating away at the policy goals of other
programs that commonly generate tax refunds, such as the EITC or the Child
Tax Credit. While this situation may not create what feels like a huge
financial burden for taxpayers, because there will not be an actual tax bill to
pay, the PTC repayment is parasitic to the goals of the other programs when
it lowers the refunds attributable to those programs.
The lowest capped repayment amount is $300, and it is reserved for
single taxpayers who make less than 200% of the FPL (but above 100% of
the FPL). Thus, in 2016, a single person making as little as $11,771 might

224
Again, empirical work is needed to confirm this phenomenon and measure the
extent to which taxpayers’ decisions are skewed. At least anecdotally, this appears to be
occurring not infrequently.
225
Recall that there is no cap for a taxpayer at or above 400% of the FPL, and for
taxpayers below 400% of the FPL, the maximum repayment ranges from $300 to $2,500
depending on filing status and income level. Code § 36B(f)(2)(B).
226
Picchi, supra note 6.
227
Lipman & Williamson, supra note 45 (manuscript at note 166 and accompanying
text); see also Seth Chandler, The Architecture of Contemporary Healthcare Reform and
Effective Marginal Rates, 29 MISS. L. REV. 335, 342 (2010) (describing the cliff effect of
denying the PTC to taxpayers with incomes at or above 400% of the FPL).
228
Lipman & Williamson, supra note 45 (manuscript at note 166 and accompanying
text).
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face a $300 repayment obligation.229 That equals 2.5% of the person’s annual
income. This is quite a large penalty for an overestimate that probably was a
completely innocent misestimate (a misestimate that was approved by the
Marketplace). To add insult to injury, there may be tax penalties added to the
repayment obligation. Anecdotally, I have talked with taxpayers who faced
PTC repayment obligations that felt cheated by the government or
bewildered by what had gone wrong and who planned on dropping coverage
so as to not face future repayment obligations. Even when faced with the
possibility of a tax penalty for failing to maintain coverage, these individuals
felt that that a certain penalty that they chose in advance to incur would be
preferable to an uncertain penalty (or repayment obligation) imposed after
the fact. Some may reason that they can apply for a waiver of the penalty due
to hardship or unaffordability. This is the worst of all possible scenarios from
a health policy standpoint -- the very design of the PTC causing people to opt
out of the system.
E. The PTC Should Have Adequate and Efficient Enforcement to Address
Fraud and Abuse
The PTC should have adequate and efficient enforcement to address
fraud and abuse. One of the biggest weaknesses faced by almost all of the
other programs discussed in this Article is a level of fraud and abuse that is
concerning. While it is impossible to completely avoid fraud and abuse, it is
important that systems and procedures be put into place to effectively combat
the problem. It is important to understand the difference between an
overpayment and fraud and abuse. Fraud and abuse entails intentional or
deliberate action by a taxpayer to claim a benefit to which he or she is not
entitled or gaming of the system to obtain an advantage. 230 An overpayment
is when the government pays a benefit that should not have paid, but does
not imply wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer. 231 An overpayment can
stem from government error, taxpayer error, or even no error at all. Whether
something is an overpayment depends in large part on how benefit eligibility
is defined. If all excess PTCs discovered on reconciliation are considered
overpayments, the program may well have a terrible record on paper.
229

See supra note 27 for calculation of federal poverty levels.
Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Online 2d ed.) (last visited July 27, 2016),
http://thelawdictionary.org/fraud/ (“Fraud consists of some deceitful practice or willful device,
resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury”);
Abuse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Online 2d ed.) (last visited July 27, 2016),
http://thelawdictionary.org/abuse/ (“A misuse of anything.”).
231
Overpayment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (last visited July 27, 2016),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/overpayment (“payment in excess of what is due”);
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 404(a) (“Whenever the Commissioner of Social Security finds that more
or less than the correct amount of payment has been made to any person under this subchapter,
proper adjustment or recovery shall be made, under regulations prescribed by the
Commissioner of Social Security, as follows . . .”).
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However, this is primarily a function of the choice to measure payments by
annualized credit-year income, which has been shown to be difficult if not
impossible to predict accurately in advance. If we instead chose to define
benefit eligibility by reference to more certain inputs, then overpayments
would decrease dramatically. While we should seek to reduce all
overpayments to the extent we are able, I believe the focus of enforcement
should be on fraud and abuse. Reducing fraud and abuse helps ensure that
the money devoted to the program is directed to those actually in need. It
also helps to insulate the program from political scrutiny. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to do a detailed analysis of what an effective
enforcement strategy might be. I strongly believe that a lot more work is
needed in this area.
The current PTC effectively has two levels of enforcement: one
when the APTC is approved and one upon reconciliation. In other words, the
current PTC combines traditional “welfare” administration and tax
administration. While having a double layer of enforcement may seem like a
good strategy for addressing fraud and abuse, in too many cases, this
combination merely constitutes a trap for an unwary taxpayer. For example,
in the first enrollment season, the federally-facilitated Marketplace
experienced many technical difficulties and had trouble verifying taxpayers’
information and resolving data mismatches. HHS announced its intent to
utilize its administrative discretion to waive some verification requirements
for taxpayers that were engaging in good faith in the process, but only for the
first enrollment year. 232 (HHS later announced that all suspect applications
would undergo a verification process.) 233 While not stated, it seems clear that
the HHS was favoring the goal of enrollment in the critical first enrollment
season over the goal of strict enforcement. Reasonable people might make
different decisions when faced with that situation, but that decision was
clearly within the HHS’s discretion. The problem was that the HHS’s
enforcement decision was not coordinated with the IRS’s enforcement step,
and innocent taxpayers were caught up in reconciliation. In fact, the HHS
explicitly pointed to the “suspenders” of the IRS’s reconciliation process to
justify loosening its own “belt” of verification for the first enrollment year. 234
There is nothing inherently wrong with two levels of enforcement. However,
232
Lori Robertson, Blunt Wrong on Income Verification, FACTCHECK.ORG (posted
July 15, 2013, updated Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.factcheck.org/2013/07/blunt-wrong-onincome-verification/.
233
Id.
234
Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health Benefits
in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal Processes, and
Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and Enrollment; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg.
42,159, 42,254 (July 15, 2013) (“We note that we believe this exercise of enforcement
discretion concerning the Exchange’s obligations to verify income information in these
specific circumstances is made in the context of all information – including the actual
household income amounts for 2014 – being available at the end of the year for the
reconciliation performed under section 36B(f) of the Code.”)
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it does seem that it is overly expensive, not very efficient, and designed more
to catch well-intentioned taxpayers rather than those who intentionally game
or defraud the system. This type of “gotcha” enforcement seems likely to
alienate taxpayers caught in the reconciliation process. At a minimum, HHS
and IRS enforcement should be coordinated. In addition to being a trap for
the unwary, uncoordinated enforcement efforts present opportunities for
abuse, as demonstrated below.
The superiority of up-front (or at least coordinated) enforcement is
illustrated by examining the clearest opportunity for abuse. A taxpayer is in
the best position by having the Marketplace find an overly-low income that
qualifies for a plan with CSR subsidies. Even though an overly-low income
means that the Marketplace would have approved an overly-large APTC
which would ultimately need to be reconciled, the taxpayer can take less than
the approved APTC (just the amount to which he or she thinks he or she is
entitled). If final credit-year income is under 400% of the FPL, the
repayment caps could prevent such a taxpayer from have a full repayment
obligation. Thus, repayment of the APTC can be limited while obtaining
overly- generous CSR subsidies that do not have to be repaid. This strategy
is explicitly easier for taxpayers whose historic income was low, due to the
Marketplace’s policy of not verifying applications that match the historic
information in the federal data hub. Of course, this type of gaming could
subject the individual to some fairly steep penalties, up to $25,000 for failing
to provides correct information due to “negligence or disregard of any rules
or regulations” of HHS and up to $250,000 for “knowingly and willfully
provid[ing] false or fraudulent information.” 235 Nevertheless, strategies like
this illustrate the need for better up-front enforcement, at the Marketplace
level, rather than relying on the IRS’s “audit and chase” enforcement
strategy.
One of the theorized benefits of tax-based administration is the
reduction of stigma and isolation for claiming benefits. 236 This benefit
appears to be realized to a significant extent in the EITC program, for
example. 237 Claiming an EITC requires a tax return, which is something that
does not separate the taxpayer out as being “needy.” Receiving a tax refund
check is an experience shared by the low-income and high-income alike. The
PTC is not so simple, nor could it be. As discussed above, the advance
payment feature of the PTC is critical to its success. Advance payment will
necessarily require some level of up-front enforcement in the form of
enrollment. Up-front verification of eligibility is likely superior as an
235

42 U.S.C. § 18081(h)(1).
Alstott, supra note 121, at 564-565.
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Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation
Loans, and the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and
Provide More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. 351, 358 (2009) (“The EITC participation
rates also appear to exceed most direct benefit programs, with participation rates estimated to
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enforcement strategy for social welfare benefits. Individual payments (and
thus overpayments) are typically small in amount, and the cost to pursue
collection of such small amounts may well be more than the overpayment
itself. 238 In this instance, it appears better to keep people from receiving
benefits for which they are not eligible rather than trying to collect improper
payments after the fact.
There is a tension with up-front enforcement between making an
accurate determination and not making enrollment unduly burdensome.
Social welfare programs have dealt with that tension for decades. With
reconciliation, however, the risk of an inaccurate estimate rests almost
exclusively with the taxpayer. This skews the enforcement incentives.
Unfortunately, the Marketplace does not appear to be doing a very good job
at combatting fraud. The Government Accountability Office found that the
Marketplace was not engaging in some basic analytical steps to identify
fraud and that 11 out of 12 fictitious “undercover shoppers” in 2014 were
able to enroll for Marketplace coverage and maintain that coverage
throughout the year, with APTC payments and CSR subsidies. 239 The
federally-facilitated Marketplace is actively working on improving the speed
and accuracy of the verification process, and it is imperative that that work
continue. Because up-front enforcement is a practical necessity, and may
well be superior, I believe it makes sense to strengthen and rely on that
enforcement rather than add another layer of after-the-fact enforcement.
In any program where the government is trying to reach a target
population with benefits, but also combat fraud and abuse, there is a delicate
balance to be struck between enforcement and a supportive enrollment
experience. In my estimation, the level of enforcement engaged in by the
federally-facilitated Marketplace strikes a relatively good balance between
enforcement and enrollment support. The federally-facilitated Marketplace is
a far different place than the prototypical stigma-inducing welfare office, in
part because it is open to all, not just those applying for assistance. 240 The
federally-facilitated Marketplace appears to do a reasonably good job of
balancing an enforcement mentality with a customer-service mentality,
engaging in outreach programs and customer-assistance programs. As the
GAO report above indicates, Marketplace enforcement needs to be
strengthened, but also can be expected to become more efficient and less
burdensome on taxpayers as the Marketplace gains experience.241
238

Alstott, supra note 121, at 587.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-29, PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: CMS SHOULD ACT TO STRENGTHEN ENROLLMENT CONTROLS AND
MANAGE FRAUD RISK (Feb. 2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675340.pdf.
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impetus of having bigger and more diverse risk pools.
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programs. For an insightful analysis of the role of private enforcement litigation in those
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
As illustrated above, the current design and administration of the
PTC could be better suited to the goals of the program. By creating financial
risk, it does not operate as well as it might as an incentive to purchase health
insurance. Even if the PTC design does not push a taxpayer out of the risk
pool, the reconciliation process is parasitic on other anti-poverty programs.
By reserving the bulk of oversight and enforcement to the reconciliation
process, it invites an unacceptable level of overpayments if not outright
fraud. By engaging in two levels of enforcement, one upon approval of an
APTC and one upon reconciliation, it wastes government and taxpayer
resources.
It is currently unclear the extent to which there might be appetite in
the United States Congress for making fairly substantial changes in the ACA.
Bernie Sanders, a candidate for the 2016 Democratic Party nomination,
advocated for a complete overhaul of the health care system and a move
toward Medicare for all, a universal, single payer system. 242 A single payer
system, or Medicare for all, was proposed but rejected in favor of the ACA’s
managed competition approach. 243 Vermont initially was moving toward
implementation of a single payer system as an alternative to the ACA, but
that initiative has been tabled by the governor.244 In Colorado, a single payer
system will be on the ballot in November 2016 as a voter initiative. 245
Clearly there is some appetite for replacing the ACA with a more expansive
reform.
On the flip side of the spectrum, the Republican-led House has voted
to repeal the ACA several dozens of times, and the now-Republican-led
Senate has recently used the budget reconciliation process to pass repeal

programs, and its potential application to the ACA and the Marketplaces, see Sarah L. Grusin,
Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces Accountable: The Unheralded Rise and Imminent
Demise of Structural Reform Litigation in Health Care, 24 ANN. HEALTH L. 337 (2015).
242
Medicare for All: Leaving No One Behind, BERNIE 2016,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/medicare-for-all/ (last visited June 14, 2016).
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and has been introduced in each subsequent Congressional session. CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22source%22%3A%22legislation%22%2C%22se
arch%22%3A%22%5C%22improved%20medicare%20for%20all%20act%5C%22%22%7D
(last visited June 14, 2016). In 2009 during the 111th Congress, the same Congress in which
the ACA was passed, it was introduced with a Democratic sponsor and 87 Democratic
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measures. 246 In 2013, Senator Ted Cruz led a successful shut down of the
federal government in an attempt to force a total repeal of the ACA. 247
Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump has proposed complete
repeal of the ACA plus reforms “based on free market principles.” 248 Thus, it
is also clear that there is appetite for a total repeal of the ACA coupled with
less-comprehensive reforms.
What is unclear is the extent to which a future Congress and
President might be interested in keeping the structure of the ACA, but
making significant improvements. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton has argued for such an approach. 249 Even the ACA-phobic Congress
of the last four years has passed incremental reforms at the edges, resisting
the ideological impetuses of complete repeal or unquestioning defense of the
status quo. 250 Thus, I feel hopeful that her legislative proposals are not lofty
academic abstractions or wishes that are divorced from reality. If a future
Congress feels inclined to improve upon the ACA, the following reforms
should be considered. Even if the specific reforms discussed in this Article
are not viable due to the political climate surrounding the ACA, the lessons
developed in this Article would be relevant to many replacement ideas. For
example, the RNC (among others) has proposed refundable tax credits
payable in advance as a mechanism for subsidizing insurance.251 In addition,
the design may increasingly be proposed outside of the health care arena. 252
246

The repeal attempt count is a bit hard to pin down exactly because it depends on
what counts as repeal, but as of February 2016, the count was around 60 attempts at repeal.
Steve Benen, On Groundhog Day, Republicans Vote to Repeal Obamacare, MSNBC.COM
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/groundhog-day-republicansvote-repeal-obamacare.
247
David A. Fahrenthold & Katie Zezima, For Ted Cruz, The 2013 Shutdown Was a
Defining
Moment,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
16,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-cruzs-plan-to-defund-obamacare-failed--andwhat-it-achieved/2016/02/16/4e2ce116-c6cb-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html.
248
Healthcare Reform to Make America Great Again, DONALDJTRUMP.COM (last
visited July 27, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/healthcare-reform.
Specifically, Mr. Trump proposes to allow the sale of health insurance across state lines, allow
individuals a full income tax deduction for health insurance premiums, allow individuals to
use Health Savings Accounts, which would be free of income tax as well as estate tax,
“require price transparency from all healthcare providers,” turn the Medicaid program into a
block grant, and “remove barriers to entry into free markets for drug providers that offer safe,
reliable and cheaper products.” Id.
249
Affordable Health Care Is a Basic Human Right, HILLARY FOR AMERICA (last
visited June 20, 2016), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/health-care/.
250
C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & JANET KINZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43289,
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TO REPEAL, DEFUND, OR DELAY THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Feb. 5,
2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43289.pdf.
251
See supra note 9.
252
The AEITC is a historic example of trying to use this benefit design for poverty
relief. In another example, a refundable, advanceable tax credit has been proposed to help
fund maternity leaves. Aparna Mathur, A Simple Proposal to Fund Maternity Leave,
FORBES.COM (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aparnamathur/2015/03/26/asimple-proposal-to-fund-maternity-leave/#3dda1ea52b93.
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A. Eliminate Reconciliation and Convert the PTC to a Prospective Benefit
While Maintaining an Option for Claiming a Retrospective Tax Credit
One approach is to simply eliminate the reconciliation process and
have the Marketplace approve benefits on a prospective rather than an
estimated basis. To address privacy concerns 253 and reduce stigma, the
option could be preserved for a taxpayer to claim the PTC retroactively on a
tax return using final credit-year income. However, as is the case now, most
taxpayers would elect to be approved in advance for an APTC based on
projected credit-year income. Thus, the PTC would still be calibrated to an
individual’s particular circumstances. It would be relatively simple to claim,
either on a tax return or through an application to the Marketplace, just as is
currently the case. The PTC would still be available to offset the current cost
of insurance. However, under my proposal, the PTC would be stable and
would not create additional financial risk for its users. Thus, the market
skewing effects identified above would be greatly alleviated. Adopting this
proposal makes the PTC program work a bit more like TANF or SNAP
benefits, where the applicant applies and is approved on a prospective basis,
with adjustments for changes in circumstances as they arise. It also
incorporates features of the HCTC program because there would be an
option to wait until tax time and claim a refundable tax credit.
While the Marketplaces will likely become better at estimating
income as everyone gains experience,254 it will be impossible to accurately
estimate income in all cases. Thus, as long as the credit remains calibrated to
credit-year income, 255 it is true that the “advance” PTCs approved under my
proposal are likely to not match the PTCs that would have been claimed on a
reconciled tax return to the same extent as they are now. Assuming that the
taxpayer responds fully and honestly to all requests for information made by
the Marketplace in the estimating process, it is entirely appropriate that the
risk for the misestimates fall on the government. The taxpayer has no choice
but to rely on the Marketplace for an estimate. The law does not allow for
third party estimates, or self estimates. The taxpayer is relying on the
government, and the government should bear the burden of doing accurate
work.
253
For an insightful analysis of the privacy tradeoffs of requiring taxpayers to
disclose detailed and often very personal to the IRS, see Michael Hatfield, Privacy in
Taxation, 69 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (available at SSRN
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2788238).
254
A majority of people working in ACA Assister Programs (people providing
outreach and enrollment assistance to Marketplace customers) responded to a poll that the
third open enrollment period (occurring at the end of 2015) went better than prior enrollment
periods, while acknowledging that significant challenges remain. KAREN POLLITZ, JENNIFER
TOLBERT & ASHLEY SEMANSKEE, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 2016 SURVEY OF HEALTH
INSURANCE JUNE 2016 MARKETPLACE ASSISTER PROGRAMS AND BROKERS, 32 (June 2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/2016-Survey-of-Marketplace-Assister-Programs-and-Brokers.
255
See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of potential alternatives.
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This approach may cause the Marketplaces to adopt a stricter
enforcement attitude, causing them to become more vigilant in confirming
eligibility. At some point, vigilant and burdensome application processes
become counterproductive, driving legitimate claimants away (and probably
out of the risk pools entirely). However, the system as it operates now
imposes a large enforcement burden on taxpayers on the front end, but
without the corresponding protection of being a final adjudication. A high
percentage of Marketplace applications generate data mismatch issues, which
is not surprising given that a data mismatch is flagged when a taxpayer
reports income or household composition that varies from the tax return filed
two years ago, among other issues. 256 The Marketplace sent many requests
for additional documentation that were confusing to taxpayers and created
anxiety and a heavy compliance burden. 257 While it is true that a hostile
Marketplace that handles applicants with overt suspicion would likely be
very detrimental to the take-up rate of the PTC, it is possible to have
effective enforcement in an assistive environment.
Another serious current issue that would be alleviated by my
proposal is the repeated enforcement to which taxpayers are subjected.
Currently, there is an enforcement process upon application for the APTC
and then an enforcement process upon filing a tax return, which seem
unreasonably burdensome and unnecessary. 258 It seems more reasonable to
rely on the Marketplace’s application process as determinative of eligibility,
and take the steps necessary to make sure that that process supports
taxpayers with the assistance needed and that there are adequate procedures
to prevent fraud and abuse. This would have the further benefit of
eliminating the administrative burden to the IRS, taxpayers, tax preparers,
and employers of having to reconcile APTCs during tax filing season. Thus,
eliminating reconciliation is likely to be more efficient overall (slightly less
efficiency for the Marketplace but much more efficiency for the IRS).
256

Amy Goldstein & Sandhya Somashekhar, Federal Health-Care Subsidies May
Be Too High Or Too Low For More Than 1 Million Americans, THE WASH. POST (May 16,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/federal-health-caresubsidies-may-be-too-high-or-too-low-for-more-than-1-millionamericans/2014/05/16/8f544992-dd14-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html
257
Daniel Chang & Nick Madigan, Consumers Asked To Verify Income, Other
Information – Or Risk Losing Government Subsidies For Health Insurance, MIAMI HERALD
(July
31,
2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1977462.html.
258
In fact, the U.S. Taxpayer Advocate is concerned that in many cases the IRS is
effectively auditing PTC returns twice, meaning that there are three levels of enforcement.
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS
168,
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1_MSP
_15_ACA-Individuals.pdf (“The pre-refund Automated Questionable Credit (AQC)
procedures for PTC mismatches impose the same burden as a post-refund PTC examination
without the same due process protections, thereby subverting the statutory protections against
multiple audits of the same return.”).
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As part of an effective enforcement strategy, taxpayers should be
under an affirmative obligation to report changes in income or household
composition so that the Marketplace can adjust the APTC amount on a going
forward basis. If the taxpayer fails to do this, then it is appropriate for there
to be reconciliation on the next tax return, or some repayment obligation.
This type of enforcement system is used by SNAP and most TANF systems,
and thus should be easy to replicate.
This approach is also very similar to the HCTC system already in
place. Taxpayers have a right to wait until they file a tax return and claim the
credit at that time. However, they may apply to the IRS for advance
payments of the credit. The advance payments really do not look or act like
part of the income tax system. 259 They are applied for and approved
separately, there is no reconciliation process, and advance payments are sent
directly to the insurance companies. 260 The advance HCTC mechanism is
intended to and actually does operate much more like a subsidized premium
system rather than a tax credit system.
Bipartisan legislation proposed prior to the passage of the ACA
demonstrates that the goal of the PTC was subsidized premiums, and that the
tax credit was merely a mechanism for providing that benefit. The Healthy
Americans Act was introduced in 2009, during the same legislative session
in which the ACA was passed. 261 A clear precursor to the PTC provisions of
the ACA, the Healthy Americans Act proposed fully subsidized premiums
for individuals under 100% of the FPL and partially subsidized premiums
based on income for individuals between 100 and 400% of the FPL. 262
Subsidies were to be calculated by a state-based purchasing pool (somewhat
analogous to a Marketplace) based on modified annual income from the
“most recent income tax return or other information furnished to the
Secretary by [the] individual, as the Secretary may require.” 263 Subsidies
were not claimed on a tax return, but were calculated upon enrollment.
The PTC, while designed as a tax credit, has the goal of operating as
a subsidized premium system. With 97% of all PTC claimants in 2014
requesting advance payments, it is clear that taxpayers want and need
reduced premium payments throughout the year, rather than a reimbursement
after the fact. The PTC design should match that reality and provide true
subsidized premiums rather than loans to taxpayers.

259
Zelenak, supra note 110, at 743-44 (noting that the HCTC is “not tax-based in
any substantive sense” and questioning Congress’ decision to impose the burden of
administering the HCTC on the IRS).
260
See supra Section II.D.
261
Healthy Americans Act, S. 391, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Sen. Ron
Wyden (D-OR) and cosponsored by eight democrats, five republicans, and one independent
democrat); Healthy Americans Act, H.R. 1321, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Rep. Anna
Eshoo (D-CA-14) and cosponsored by eight democrats and two republicans).
262
Healthy Americans Act, S. 391 § 121; H.R. 1321 § 121.
263
Healthy Americans Act, S. 391 § 123; H.R. 1321 § 123.
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B. Calculate Premium Subsidies Using Other Measures of Income
Eliminating reconciliation of the PTC opens a major opportunity;
without reconciliation,264 APTC payments can be based on something other
than subsidy-year annual income and household size figures. There is
nothing inherent in the PTC that requires use of subsidy-year information.
Other programs use different methods, like TANF and SNAP. Presumably,
subsidy-year income was used to more closely assess need. 265 It is not clear
that subsidy-year information is the “best” measure; that depends on the
goals for the program. If we choose to emphasize getting subsidies to
taxpayers in current need of them, we would tie eligibility to monthly data,
like TANF and SNAP. 266 If we choose to emphasize certainty and efficiency
over other values, we would tie eligibility to past data. The statute calls for
APTC amounts to be based on income from the most recent taxable year
available, unless there have been changes in circumstances that affect
eligibility. 267 The most recent taxable year available is two years before the
subsidy year because open enrollment for the upcoming year occurs before
tax returns are due for the just completed year. HHS uses the change in
circumstances rule to justify calculating APTC payments based on an
estimate of subsidy-year income rather than the tax return from the year
before last, likely in an attempt to make the APTCs match as closely as
possible the reconciled PTC amounts, which are based on subsidy-year
income. But if reconciliation were eliminated, the Marketplace could adopt
different rules for calculating APTC payments.
The most administratively complex measurement, but the most
accurate in terms of matching subsidies with need, would be to base
premium subsidies on monthly income. State-based welfare programs could
serve as a model for this type of system. Because health insurance generally
is paid for monthly and is effective in month-long segments, using monthly
income makes sense. The current PTC is calculated monthly, recognizing
that health insurance operates in a monthly cycle. Such a system would
provide a stronger safety net for people whose situations change suddenly. A
sudden drop in income could cause the health insurance bill to be
unaffordable, and a monthly subsidy program would open the path to a
subsidy to help. Conversely, a sudden rise in income makes the monthly
insurance bill more affordable, but only on a going forward basis.
This type of subsidy system is probably the most intrusive option;
the Marketplace would need to monitor the taxpayer’s income continually, or
at least periodically. This type of oversight could lead to lower take up of the
264

Actually, there could be reconciliation coupled with other income measures, but
it likely would not be tax return based.
265
Zelenak, supra note 110, at 733-737 (questioning whether subsidy-year income
is the ideal standard for determining subsidy eligibility and amount).
266
Id.
267
42 U.S.C. § 18082(b)(1)(B), (b)(2).
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subsidies because some people avoid benefit programs when the “hassle
factor” becomes too high. 268 A strict monthly system may be subject to more
gaming. A taxpayer with the ability to “bunch” income may manipulate his
or her income to be eligible for subsidies during low-income months, even
though insurance is overall affordable to the taxpayer. On the other hand, a
taxpayer with unavoidably variable income may lose eligibility for subsidies
during high-income months, even though insurance overall is unaffordable to
that person.A solution to these problems is to adopt a smoothing mechanism
for calculating premium subsidies, rather than a strict month-by-month
method. Using income averaging mechanisms, the Marketplace could
smooth income over several months or even several years. A smoothing
mechanism would make it much harder for taxpayers to game the system by
manipulating income, and it would protect taxpayers who have unusual and
short-term spikes in income. A smoothing mechanism would better serve
taxpayers because it would produce a fairly steady, though not unchangeable,
premium subsidy. A subsidy amount that is reliable in amount would support
better insurance purchasing decisions. Taxpayers could “right size” their
purchase of insurance if they could know the true cost of that insurance.
The use of annual accounting periods for reporting and paying
income tax has long been widely recognized as being the source of
horizontal equity problems; equally-positioned taxpayers have different tax
results depending on when their income is obtained. 269 A traditional solution
to this problem is income averaging, and the Code has contained various
income averaging provisions at different points in its history. 270 While
income averaging has been generally criticized because it tends to favor
wealthier taxpayers (violating vertical equity and progressivity principles),
some have defended income averaging for lower-income taxpayers. 271 While
it would be important to look at those provisions for lessons learned, this
Article’s proposal that the Marketplace utilize income averaging methods to
calculate premium subsidies has more in common with smoothing
mechanisms used by businesses to improve forecasts. 272 Because what we
are really asking the Marketplace to do is forecast future income (as a
268
Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 215, at 4 (exploring the role of “‘psychological
frictions’ associated with low program awareness, confusion, or an aversion to program
complexity or hassles” in failure to claim EITC benefits).
269
Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed
Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 546-548 (1984) (explaining the
horizontal equity problems associated with annual accounting periods and progressive rates).
270
Id. at 510-511.
271
See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered,
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003) (demonstrating that the poor are affected more severely by
income fluctuations and arguing for targeted averaging mechanisms); Neil H. Buchanan, The
Case against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151 (2006) (endorsing limited income
averaging for lower-income taxpayers).
272
See John C. Chambers, Satinder K. Mullick & Donald D. Smith, How to Choose
the Right Forecasting Technique, HARVARD BUS. REV. (1971) (explaining different
forecasting techniques and when businesses might use over another).
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substitute for future need for a premium subsidy), allowing the Marketplace
to employ widely-used forecasting mechanisms is sensible. 273
A potential concern with adopting a smoothing mechanism to
calculate premiums subsidies is that the process is unlikely to be very
transparent. It could be difficult for taxpayers to understand how their
subsidies were calculated because, while not exceptionally complex
mathematically, smoothing is likely beyond the math capacity of the vast
majority of taxpayers. 274 This is probably especially true of lower-income
taxpayers, who generally are less educated that higher-income taxpayers.275
Thus, taxpayers may lack confidence that their subsidies are accurate. It
could also be harder to discover and appeal erroneous calculations.
A middle approach would be to base subsidies on prior year tax
return income, but move open enrollment to mid-year. If open enrollment
were moved to begin shortly after the due date for filing a return, then morerecent tax return information would be available, except for taxpayers who
file on extension. This would be much more transparent and would be
efficient for both the government and the taxpayer. There would, however,
be a loss of accuracy in terms of reliably getting subsides to taxpayers with
current need. Whether that is a tradeoff worth making in exchange for easier
enrollment and no reconciliation is hard to say. It would certainly be a more
efficient system, though less responsive. The Marketplace could continue to
use a changed circumstances exception for taxpayers with respect to whom
even the prior year income figures are very inaccurate for determining need.
A taxpayer who requests an exception from using the prior year tax return
could be required to periodically verify income throughout the year, to limit
abuse.
C. Establish Safe Harbors that Protect Reasonable Reliance
Safe harbors are a technique used frequently to promote efficiency
and predictability and to demonstrate good faith compliance. For example,
the penalty for failure to pay estimated tax is waived under the statute if the
taxpayer meets certain safe harbors, one of which is that the taxpayer made
estimated payments equal to the tax due for the previous year. 276 As an
273
Smoothing is so prevalent in business forecasting that basic spreadsheet
programs include smoothing functions. Mary Ann Richardson, Excel Quick Tip: Use Excel’s
Exponential Smoothing Add-In Analysis Tool to Forecast Future Demand, TOOLBOX.COM
(Apr.
29,
2015),
http://it.toolbox.com/blogs/it-solutions/excel-quick-tip-use-excelsexponential-smoothing-addin-analysis-tool-to-forecast-future-demand-66516.
274
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., COUNTRY NOTE: UNITED STATES,
SURVEY
OF
ADULT
SKILLS
FIRST
RESULTS
(2013)
https://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/Country%20note%20-%20United%20States.pdf (noting that
the average American is at a level 2 in numeracy; being able to check the accuracy of
statistical forecasting would probably require level 4 or 5 skills).
275
Id.
276
Code § 6654(d)(1)(B).
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alternative to eliminating the reconciliation process for all taxpayers,
Congress could establish safe harbors to protect good faith participation in
the process. Congress has more leeway than the IRS in crafting safe harbors.
For example, Congress could waive repayment of excess APTCs to the
extent that APTC payments in the current year do not exceed the amount of
PTC to which the taxpayer was eligible in the prior tax year, or to the extent
that the APTC payments are within certain tolerance levels of prior years’
eligibility. The primary political challenge would be in identifying the
acceptable level of mismatch between APTC payments and ultimate
eligibility. I am somewhat skeptical of this approach because to the extent
that the PTC is viewed as “welfare” or a handout, tolerance for any mismatch
is likely to be low from a political standpoint, just as the repayment caps
have been weakened But such an approach offers partial protection to
taxpayers willing to use prior years’ information and does so in an efficient
way.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSAL: GOOD FAITH SAFE HARBOR
This Article’s legislative proposals are the most direct and simplest
way to correct the problem of taxpayers bearing the burden of inaccurate
PTC estimates performed by the Marketplaces. However, politically
speaking, it may be unrealistic to expect Congress to adopt legislative fixes
to an act that still generates intense political skepticism. In fact, attempting to
legislatively fix the ACA may jeopardize its very existence because it seems
relatively clear that the ACA’s detractors would use the opportunity to seek
outright repeal or to seek changes that would weaken the ACA. 277 To the
extent that Congress revisits the ACA, it should seriously consider these
proposed reforms. To the extent that Congress turns toward replacement
reforms, this Article’s observations may be helpful.
However, another way forward may be to pursue an administrative
solution. An administrative solution will necessarily be a compromise,
offering protection to only a subset of affected taxpayers, but it would be an
improvement over the status quo. Specifically, I propose that the IRS and
HHS establish a safe harbor that allow a taxpayer to claim an exemption
from the reconciliation requirement where the taxpayer has (1) claimed an
APTC, (2) cooperated fully with the Marketplace’s requests for information
as it estimated the APTC, and (3) promptly reported to the Marketplace all
changes in income and household composition.
The IRS already has embarked on the task of creating administrative
rules and regulations that effectively create exceptions to explicit statutory
language. For example, while the statute requires married individuals to file a
joint return in order to claim a PTC, the IRS has created a limited exception

277

See supra notes 246 and 247 and accompanying text.

56

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ___:__

to this requirement for victims of domestic abuse or spousal abandonment. 278
To claim that the domestic abuse or abandoned spouse exception, a victim
must (1) be living apart from the spouse when the return is filed and (2) be
unable to file a joint return because of the abuse or abandonment. 279 The
taxpayer must certify on the married filing separate tax return that he or she
meets those criteria by checking a box on IRS Form 8962. 280 The exception
can only be claimed for three consecutive years. 281
The IRS also has created an exception to the repayment obligation
for taxpayers on the cusp of 100% of the FPL. Normally, if a taxpayer
receives an APTC during the year and, upon filing a tax return, discovers that
he or she actually was under 100% of the FPL and thus not eligible for any
PTC amount, that taxpayer would have to repay the subsidy, subject to the
repayment cap. However, the IRS has created an exception that waives
repayment in this situation. 282 This exception is very similar to the proposal
advanced by this Article. It protects reliance by a taxpayer on a
Marketplace’s estimate of an APTC.
Another example of the IRS creating special rules that ease taxpayer
burden in the face of the complexity of the ACA, and that also protects
taxpayer from burdens due to Marketplace error, occurs when a taxpayer is
approved by an Marketplace for an APTC but it is later determined that the
taxpayer was eligible for Medicaid. 283 Recall that the Marketplace has the
responsibility of screening enrollees for Medicaid eligibility; if the taxpayer
is eligible for Medicaid, he or she is not eligible for a PTC.284 Under the IRS
278

I previously explored this exception thoroughly and argued for an extension of
the exception to other taxpayers and other tax benefits. Pareja, supra note 56.
279
Final and temporary regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 43,622 (July 28, 2014) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)). Abandonment is determined based on all facts and
circumstances and exists if “the taxpayer is unable to locate his or her spouse after reasonable
diligence.” Id. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)(iv). Domestic abuse is defined fairly broadly as including
“physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse, including efforts to control, isolate,
humiliate, and intimidate, or to undermine the victim’s ability to reason independently” and is
determined based on all facts and circumstances. Id. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)(iii).
280
Id. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)(ii)(C) (taxpayer must “[c]ertif[y] on the return, in
accordance with the relevant instructions, that the taxpayer meets the criteria of this paragraph
(b)(2)(ii)”).
281
Id. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)(v).
282
Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(b)(6). I.R.S., Instructions for Form 8962: Premium Tax
Credit (PTC), at 7 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8962.pdf.
283
Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(c)(2)(v). IRS PTC Q&A, supra note 31, at question 26 (“If
a Marketplace makes a determination or assessment that an individual is ineligible for
Medicaid or CHIP and eligible for APTC when the individual enrolls in a qualified health
plan, the individual is treated as not eligible for Medicaid or CHIP for purposes of the
premium tax credit for the duration of the period of coverage under the qualified health plan
(generally, the rest of the plan year). Accordingly, if you were enrolled in both Medicaid
coverage and in a qualified health plan for which advance credit payments were made for one
or more months of the year following a Marketplace determination or assessment that you
were ineligible for Medicaid, you can claim the premium tax credit for these months, if you
are otherwise eligible.”).
284
Code § 36B(c)(2)(B).
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exception, where the Marketplace made an erroneous conclusion that the
taxpayer was not eligible for Medicaid and instead approved the taxpayer for
an APTC, the taxpayer will not have to repay any excess PTC amount for the
period he or she was erroneously enrolled in a Marketplace plan. 285 This is
true even if the taxpayer enrolls in Medicaid when the error is discovered but
fails to drop the Marketplace plan, and thus is dual enrolled. 286 The IRS
treats those taxpayers as being eligible for Medicaid, generally through the
rest of the plan year.287
HHS has created a special rule that allows it to waive verification
requirements where a taxpayer has attempted in good faith to provide
documentation. 288 While not frequently used, and not a safe harbor that can
be categorically claimed by a taxpayer, the existence of this type of
discretion demonstrates that there is room for some leniency in the process.
In all of these cases, special rules were crafted to protect taxpayers
with respect to whom the regular rules are inappropriate. I propose that the
regular rule of reconciliation is inappropriate with respect to a taxpayer who
has fully engaged in good faith in the process of estimating income and
household composition.
VII. CONCLUSION
The goals of the ACA are lofty indeed. Universal (or near-universal)
health coverage has been an elusive policy target for decades. Assuming that
the United States continues to desire to work toward universal coverage, and
assuming that the United States continues to use an ACA-type model as the
vehicle for achieving universal coverage, a premium subsidy to make private
coverage affordable is a necessary element. The PTC is a critical cog in the
ACA reforms, and while the PTC is an improvement over the prior status
quo of little to no subsidies, as this Article has demonstrated, the PTC can be
improved in ways that should boost participation rates.
The current design of the PTC, with an estimated credit amount
based on end-of-credit-year income and household composition payable
ratably throughout the year, followed by a reconciliation process where the
taxpayer may have to repay some or all of the advance payments, creates
285
IRS PTC Q&A, supra note 31, at question 26 (“If a Marketplace makes a
determination or assessment that an individual is ineligible for Medicaid or CHIP and eligible
for APTC when the individual enrolls in a qualified health plan, the individual is treated as not
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP for purposes of the premium tax credit for the duration of the
period of coverage under the qualified health plan (generally, the rest of the plan year).
Accordingly, if you were enrolled in both Medicaid coverage and in a qualified health plan for
which advance credit payments were made for one or more months of the year following a
Marketplace determination or assessment that you were ineligible for Medicaid, you can claim
the premium tax credit for these months, if you are otherwise eligible.”).
286
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287
Id.
288
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avoidable problems for taxpayers and the government. This design creates
financial uncertainty for low-income households and undercuts the
effectiveness of other anti-poverty programs administered through the
federal tax code. The design uses a double enforcement strategy divided
between two federal agencies, which is an inefficient use of government
resources. The double enforcement strategy is not justifiable because it is
more effective. Because the IRS and HHS enforcement is relatively
uncoordinated, the double layer does not meaningfully reduce fraud or abuse
and may actually increase opportunities for fraud and abuse in the CSR
subsidy program. HHS is heavily focused on boosting enrollment, often by
relaxing income verification requirements, on the explicit assumption that
the IRS reconciliation process will rectify errors in the APTC estimates.
There is no taxpayer reconciliation process for CSR subsidies, so this
enforcement shift creates opportunities for fraud and abuse with respect to
those subsidies.
It is true that the IRS reconciliation process will catch many overand underpayments of the APTC (to the extent that taxpayers file returns and
to the extent those returns are accurate). However, as detailed in this Article,
both underpayments and overpayments create real, systemic problems from a
health policy standpoint. An underpayment means that the subsidy did not
efficiently affect the health insurance purchasing decision, which is the
ultimate goal of the program. An overpayment either reduces a tax refund
that likely was the result of a different tax program designed to combat
poverty or converts the subsidized health policy purchaser into a tax debtor.
The IRS PTC reconciliation process is focused on discovering tax debts,
imposing tax penalties, and collecting money after the fact, and is rather
impersonal. Owing tax, having tax penalties imposed, or undergoing an audit
is understandably troubling to most taxpayers, leading to the misperception
that either the taxpayer did something wrong or that the system is not fair.
However, as this Article demonstrated, it is easy for a well-intentioned
taxpayer to do everything “right,” to follow all the rules, to engage fully and
in good faith in the HHS and IRS system, and still owe a reconciliation
amount. In fact, in the first year of the program only 8% of the taxpayer
claiming the PTC received an accurate APTC payment, with over half of the
claimants owing a reconciliation amount. 289 Labeling these often-innocent
taxpayers as tax scofflaws is a strong stigma and may well push people away
from the insurance pools that are at the core of the ACA’s strategy for
increasing insurance coverage and reducing insurance premiums. This
dynamic is important for evaluating future reforms of the PTC. However,
Congress also should consider the downsides of this dynamic when
designing possible future benefits that utilize tax credits payable in advance
with reconciliation.
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This Article compared the current PTC design with a salient
selection of other social welfare programs. From those comparisons, this
Article developed a set of design goals that could guide PTC reform efforts
or could guide the development of delivery systems for other subsidy
programs intended to support specific purchases. Specifically, this Article
concludes that important design goals include that the PTC (1) should be
sufficiently large that insurance is considered affordable by its users, (2)
should be relatively simple to claim, (3) should be currently available to
offset the current cost of insurance, (4) should be stable and not create
additional financial risk for its users, and (5) should have adequate and
efficient enforcement to address fraud and abuse. Some of these design goals
are in tension with other, but they all are important features of an effective
program.
This Article then detailed specific and concrete legislative proposals
for reforming the PTC to advance these design goals and correct some of the
problems inherent in the current PTC design, once again borrowing from
lessons learned from other social welfare programs. Specifically, this Article
explored the option of eliminating reconciliation and relying exclusively on
the Marketplace determination of the APTC as a conclusive benefit
determination, much like what happens currently with the CSR subsidies.
This Article also explored the possibility of using a different metric
for measuring income and household composition that would create more
certainty than using credit-year figures. Different choices have different
trade-offs in terms meeting actual taxpayer need, ease of administration for
the government and ease of utilization for the taxpayer, avoiding being
overly intrusive (which has privacy implications as well as being a concern
for the participation rate), and being effective at combatting fraud and abuse.
This Article specifically looked at basing the APTC amounts on (1) monthly
income (similar to TANF or SNAP), (2) a prediction of future monthly
income using a smoothing mechanism that would even out monthly income
fluctuations, and (3) the immediate prior tax year amounts which would be
possible for most individuals if open enrollment were moved to after the tax
return filing deadline. This Article finished with a discussion of what a safe
harbor would look like that would protect individuals who have acted in
good faith from repaying reconciliation amounts, whether such a safe harbor
were adopted by Congress or pursued by the IRS.
Any of these reforms would improve the functioning of the PTC.
Each should be seriously considered by policy makers considering reforms.
The ultimate goal must be kept firmly in mind. We are seeking to entice the
uninsured to jump into an insurance risk pool. Asking the uninsured to jump
into a pool that harbors a lurking shark in the form of reconciliation is
unwise.

